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Abstract: The EU/UK negotiations on Brexit are now imminent following the formal 
notification by Prime Minister May of the UK’s intention to leave the EU in the ‘Article 50 letter’ 
delivered to European Council President Tusk on 29 March 2017. The treatment of financial 
services will be a critical element of these negotiations. Prime Minister May had previously 
indicated in her 17 January 2017 speech on the UK’s negotiating objectives that the UK is to 
leave the single market and confirmed this position in the Article 50 letter. Under current EU 
financial law the UK will accordingly become a ‘third country’ on Brexit. UK financial firms and 
actors will lose the ability to ‘passport’ into the single market in financial services from the UK 
– unless passporting rights are preserved under any new EU/UK arrangement, an outcome 
which is highly unlikely. This paper considers the risks to the EU from its oft-described 
‘investment banker’ becoming a third country and explores the regulatory remedies which may 
be available and the preferences which may shape these remedies. 
The paper adopts a legal-institutionalist perspective, which draws on the insights of 
comparative/international political economy, to examine the implications of the UK’s future 
status as a ‘third country’ for the EU capital market and for its current flagship Capital Markets 
Union (CMU) agenda. The extent to which EU regulation is transformative is contested in 
relation to the development of the EU capital market. But the EU regulatory regime which 
governs third country access to the EU capital market is likely to be a significant determinant of 
the strength of the EU’s capacity to absorb the loss of the UK from the single EU capital market 
and to contain related stability, liquidity, and efficiency risks. Drawing on international 
experience with access arrangements and on EU preferences and incentives, the paper considers 
the likely future of the current third country regime and how it might be re-configured so that 
third country access is based on a more secure footing.   
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1. INTRODUCTION:                                                                        
CAPITAL MARKETS UNION, REGULATION, AND THIRD 
COUNTRIES 
 
The passage through the UK Parliament of the Withdrawal from the European 
Union (Article 50) Bill 2016-17 on 13 March 2017 opened the way to the formal 
notification by the UK of its intention to withdraw from the EU under Article 50 
of the Treaty on European Union. This notification followed on 29 March 2017 
with Prime Minister May’s ‘Article 50 letter’ to European Council President Tusk. 
After a period of intense discussion and speculation on the potential treatment of 
financial services,1 an area of acute importance to the UK and to the EU 27, 
negotiations can get underway. But although the 23 June 2016 Brexit decision is 
already having an impact on the City of London and on UK financial regulation 
policy,2 details on how a new EU/UK settlement on financial services might be 
configured are in short supply. Prime Minister May’s 17 January 2017 speech on the 
UK’s negotiating objectives3 clarified that the UK will not seek membership of the 
single market or the European Economic Area. Since then, the government’s 2 
February 2017 White Paper on Brexit called for ‘the freest possible trade in financial 
services between the UK and EU Member States.’4 But the speech and the White 
Paper were very short on specifics. Prime Minister May’s speech referred generally 
to seeking the ‘greatest possible access’ to the single market through a new Free 
Trade Agreement which could, in certain areas including financial services, ‘take in 
elements of current single market arrangements.’ The Prime Minister also noted the 
possibility of a ‘phased implementation period’, suggesting that a transitional 
arrangement of some form was likely to be sought. The White Paper relegated 
financial services to four short paragraphs which set out vague aspirations as to 
continued market access and cooperation. The 29 March Article 50 letter, while 
economical, is more revealing. Reflecting earlier indications, it confirms that the UK 
                                                      
1 From the many reports see, for an EU perspective, European Parliament, Economic and Monetary Affairs 
Committee, Potential Concepts for the Future EU-UK Relationship in Financial Services, Study for the 
ECON Committee by C Gortsos (IP/A/ECON-2016-20) (2017) and, for a UK perspective, House of 
Lords, European Union Committee, 9th Report of Session 2016 2017, Brexit: Financial Services (2016). 
2 One early casualty of the Brexit decision has been the proposed merger between the London Stock 
Exchange Group and Deutsche Bӧrse. The deal came close to collapse in February 2017 following a request 
from the Commission that the London Stock Exchange divest one its trading platforms, but Brexit-related 
opposition in Germany and the UK has also been associated with the difficulties: P Stafford, R Toplensky, 
and J Shotter, ‘LSE Blamed as Deutsche Bӧrse Tie-up Hits Rocks,’ Financial Times, 28 February 2017. The 
deal was subsequently blocked by the Commission. From a policy perspective, the February 2017 review 
by the UK Financial Conduct Authority of the rules which apply to initial public offerings (FCA, Reforming 
the Availability of Information in the UK Equity IPO Process, Consultation Paper 17/5 (2017)) has been 
associated with efforts to reinforce the attractiveness of the UK capital market.  
3 ‘The Government’s Negotiating Objectives for Exiting the EU’, 17 January 2017, available via 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-
pm-speech. 
4 Department for Exiting the EU, The United Kingdom’s Exit From and New Partnership with the 
European Union (Cm 9417), February 2017, para 8.25. 
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is to leave the single market and proposes implementation periods (generally). But 
it expressly references financial services, one of the few industries to be specified in 
the letter, and calls for financial services to be covered in a ‘bold and ambitious’ Free 
Trade Agreement. Most significantly, it notes that the UK and the EU have 
regulatory frameworks (generally) that already match and that the negotiations 
should accordingly prioritise how the evolution of regulatory frameworks is to be 
managed and how disputes are to be resolved. The letter accordingly identifies two 
key issues for financial services access which have been debated since the Brexit 
referendum: dispute resolution and the role of the Court of Justice; and how, given 
the likelihood of future regulatory divergence between the UK and the EU, market 
access can be managed and mutual recognition of regulation assured - whether 
under a Free Trade Agreement which covers financial services access or in relation 
to the EU's current 'equivalence rules' which govern access to the EU financial 
market.    
Whether or not the UK will succeed in negotiating a Free Trade Agreement 
with a bespoke financial market access arrangement which addresses these two 
pivotal and complex issues is not, given the different EU and UK incentives and 
preferences engaged, clear. It is, however, clear that, under current EU law, the UK 
will have ‘third country’ status in relation to the EU financial market when it leaves 
the EU. The ‘equivalence’ device, the regulatory technique which the EU uses to 
manage third country access to the EU financial market and to manage the extra-
territorial application of EU financial regulation has therefore come to dominate the 
policy discourse; the importance of regulatory equivalence to market access 
arrangements is also implied in the Article 50 letter reference to the need to manage 
regulatory divergence in the proposed Free Trade Agreement. One leading UK 
regulator, Andrew Bailey – chief executive of the UK Financial Conduct Authority 
– has called for market access to be based on a new equivalence arrangement,5 
‘TheCityUk’, a leading City lobbying group, has supported an equivalence-based 
access arrangement,6 and a call has been made for an international consensus on the 
interpretation and measurement of equivalence.7 An arcane regulatory device 
embedded in the entrails of EU financial legislation has come centre stage, as have 
potential functional substitutes for the current equivalence regime which could be 
used in a bespoke arrangement contained in a Free Trade Agreement. The 
equivalence issue, and the related management of UK access to the EU financial 
                                                      
5 Speech by A Bailey, FCA Chief Executive, ‘Free Trade in Financial Services and Global Regulatory 
Standards: friends not rivals’, Economic Council Financial Markets Policy Conference, 26 January 2017. 
6 TheCityUK, Brexit and UK-based Financial and Related Professional Services (2017). The Financial 
Times has taken a similar position: Editorial, ‘The City Sets Plausible Goals for Life after Brexit,’ Financial 
Times, 14 January, 2017 and Editorial, ‘Equivalence Makes Sense for the City and Europe’, Financial Times, 
28 February 2017. 
7 Financial Services Negotiation Forum and Norton Rose Fulbright, Examining Regulatory Equivalence, 
12 January 2017 (2017 FSNF/Norton Rose Report).  
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market, is not solely of interest to the UK as it moves to third country status.8 It is 
of signal importance to the EU and, in particular, to its current Capital Markets 
Union (CMU) agenda, as discussed below. Similarly, it is a bellwether of EU 
intentions in regard to the Brexit negotiations on capital market access. The late 
February 2017 publication by the Commission of a ‘working document’ which is 
designed somewhat modestly to ‘provide a factual overview of third-country 
provisions,’ but which can be read as signalling a potentially tough approach to 
UK/EU market access discussions, underlines the current political salience of the 
third country rules.9 It is hard not to read the Commission’s assertion that 
equivalence is ‘not a vehicle for liberalizing international trade in financial services’ 
but a mechanism for managing cross-border activity in a sound and secure 
prudential environment, and that ‘equivalence decisions primarily benefit EU 
market participants’,10 as a shot across the bows to the UK and as an indication of 
intent in regard to any UK special pleading in relation to equivalence, whether under 
the current EU regime or in a bespoke Free Trade Agreement regime, as signalled 
by the Article 50 letter. 
CMU is the current ambitious, primarily regulatory project to accelerate the 
construction of an EU capital market; embed market-based funding in the EU (or 
the raising of finance through market-based instruments rather than bank credit); 
and wean the EU from its dependence on bank-based funding.11 Capital market 
regulation and capital market construction have long been at the intersection of 
several deeply embedded fault-lines which run underneath the single market.  They 
are highly contested spheres of EU competence in relation to which different 
Member State preferences, shaped by diverging political interests and related 
varieties of capitalism and of financial system,12 supranational and institutional 
                                                      
8 For extensive assessment of the UK’s position and the relevance of the equivalence mechanism to post 
Brexit UK/EU relations, see E Ferran, The UK as a Third Country in EU Financial Services Regulation, 
University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No 47/2016, available via 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2845374, and J Armour, ‘Brexit and Financial Services’ 33 (Supp 1) Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy  (2017) S54. 
9 Commission, EU Equivalence Decisions in Financial Services Policy: An Assessment (SWD (2017) 102) 
(2017) (2017 Commission Equivalence Report). Section five of this paper considers the signalling which 
can be implied from the Report. 
10 Ibid, 5. 
11 Set out in Commission, Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union (COM (2015) 468) (2015). For 
assessments see E Micheler, ‘Building a Capital Markets Union: Improving the Market Infrastructure’ 17 
European Business Organization Law Review (2016) 481, and N Moloney, ‘Capital Markets Union: Ever Closer 
Union for the EU Financial System?’ 41(3) European Law Review (2016) 307. 
12 For a recent example see D Howarth and L Quaglia, ‘Internationalized Banking, Alternative Banks, and 
the Single Supervisory Mechanism’ 39(3) West European Politics (2016) 438.  
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interests,13 and private sector interests,14 have repeatedly clashed.15 The form of 
capitalism which the EU should follow; the style of regulation which should 
encourage or control it; the location of regulatory intervention (EU or local; euro 
area or single market); the extent to which related risks should be mutualized across 
the Member States - all have been contested, often fiercely.16 Capital market 
construction is still therefore something of a work-in-progress for the EU. If the 
CMU agenda succeeds in facilitating market-based funding and in diversifying 
funding sources, and can accommodate the competing preferences on capital 
market construction, it may strengthen significantly the EU’s financial system and 
its ability to deliver growth. But success will also signal that the excision of the UK, 
the largest and most sophisticated financial centre in the EU, from the single market 
has been absorbed by the EU financial system and managed by its financial 
governance arrangements. Much depends thus on how the EU approaches the legal 
mechanisms governing access by the UK to the EU as third country - the 
equivalence device and the related application of third country rules. 
The confluence of Brexit and CMU means that these legal mechanisms matter 
given their potentially transformative effects on the EU capital market. Regulation 
has long been a contested variable in EU financial governance. Whether or not EU 
regulation can have transformative, market-changing effects on market 
development, or is at best facilitative of evolutionary processes driven by political 
and market forces, has long been contested and from a range of perspectives.17 But 
it is hard to disavow that regulation, in the form of the EU’s current third country 
rules, will have a determinative impact on how the EU capital market will fare post 
Brexit. The UK’s post Brexit regulatory characterization as a third country has 
(assuming the current EU third country access rules will apply to the UK) two sets 
of regulatory consequences which are likely to have spill-over effects for the CMU 
project and the EU capital market. The first concerns the ‘external/access’ 
consequences and relates to how the EU’s current market access rules for third 
countries may shape the EU capital market. The second set of consequences relate 
to how the current ‘export’ rules of EU capital market regulation (the rules which 
                                                      
13 In relation to the new institutional preferences generated by the EU’s Banking Union, eg, see R Epstein 
and M Rhodes, ‘The Political Dynamics Behind Europe’s New Banking Union’ 39(3) West European Politics 
(2016) 415, and S de Rynck, 23(1) ‘Banking on a Union: the Politics of Changing Eurozone Banking 
Supervision’ 22 Journal of European Public Policy (2016) 119.  
14 On the preferences of the EU banking sector see L Quaglia, The European Union and Global Financial 
Regulation (OUP, 2014). 
15 As has been charted in a rich comparative political economy literature. See, eg, the collection of articles 
in 21(3) Journal of European Public Policy (2014). 
16 For a review see N Moloney, ‘Financial Markets Regulation’ in A Arnull and D Chalmers (eds), Oxford 
Handbook of European Union Law (OUP, 2014), and D Mügge, Financial Regulation in the European Union: 
A Research Agenda, Centre for European Studies, Harvard University, Open Forum CES Paper Series, 10 
(2012).  
17 From a legal perspective see Moloney n 16, and E Ferran, Building an EU Securities Market (CUP, 2004); 
from a comparative political economy perspective see E Grossman and P Leblond, ‘European Financial 
Integration: Finally the Great Leap Forward’ 49 Journal of Common Market Studies (2011) 413, and I Hardie 
and D Howarth (eds), Market-based Banking and the International Financial Crisis (OUP, 2013). 
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impose qualifications and conditions on engagement by EU actors with third 
country actors18) will shape the EU capital market. The scale of these ‘access’ and 
‘export’ consequences is likely to be a function of the extent to which, and for how 
long, UK financial governance (including regulation, supervision, and enforcement) 
can be legally characterized as ‘equivalent’ to EU governance in accordance with the 
relevant third country rules. The uncertainties and complexities associated with the 
access and export rules and with equivalence are manifold and cut across many 
vectors, including: substantive (what is ‘equivalence’?); institutional (who makes the 
equivalence determination and resolves disputes?); procedural (how is dynamism, in 
the form of change to financial governance, managed?) and environmental (the 
interaction with WTO/GATS rules and the geo-political/market context).  
These equivalence-related regulatory challenges are a function of the EU’s 
distinct governance arrangements for financial markets. International financial 
governance has also been grappling with access and export issues, albeit to a much 
lesser extent. The major preoccupation of international financial governance for 
some time has been the adoption of standards by the International Standard Setting 
Bodies (ISSBs), such as the Financial Stability Board (FSB - which oversees 
standard-setting generally) and the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO -  the ISSB for capital markets). These standards reflect 
international reform priorities, usually steered by the G20, and are typically geared 
to strengthening financial stability and to supporting cross-border supervisory 
cooperation and coordination. But international financial governance has recently 
begun to adopt a more operational posture and to address the difficulties generated 
where regulatory systems collide.19 It may therefore offer lessons for the EU if it 
constructs a new channel for UK/EU financial market access, whether in a Free 
Trade Agreement or otherwise.  
The third country rules which govern access to the EU capital market were 
until the Brexit referendum a relatively quiet corner of EU financial governance, 
although the third country regime is of relatively longstanding.20 Arcane and 
technical though they may be, the confluence of Brexit and the CMU agenda has 
created a crucible within which these rules are likely to acquire stronger 
                                                      
18 These include the EU banking rules which apply a higher capital charge to EU banks in relation to certain 
loan assets where these originate outside the EU, unless the loans are located in a jurisdiction which is 
‘equivalent’ to the EU. The Commission’s 2017 report on equivalence is clear in the priority it attaches to 
the export dimension of equivalence, noting that while equivalence decisions may enhance the possibilities 
of doing business in the EU, the equivalence process is primarily directed to prudential regulatory purposes: 
2017 Commission Equivalence Report, n 9, 5-6. 
19 N Moloney, ‘International Financial Governance, the EU, and Brexit: the “Agencification” of EU 
Financial Governance and the Implications’ 17 European Business Organization Law Review (2016) 451, and E 
Helleiner and S Pagliari ‘The End of an Era in International Financial Regulation? A Post-Crisis Research 
Agenda’ 65 International Organization (2011) 169. 
20 As of 2017, some 212 equivalence decisions had been adopted by the Commission and 32 jurisdictions 
assessed as equivalent in relation to at least one aspect of EU financial governance: 2017 Commission 
Equivalence Report, n 9, 10. The rules have, however, received attention from comparative political 
economists as they reveal how Member State preferences in relation to market access are formed (section 
three below).  
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transformative effects and to become lightning rods for the formation of 
preferences in relation to UK/EU relations, the open-ness of the EU capital market, 
and the desirability of the CMU agenda. This discussion accordingly probes the 
implications of Brexit for the EU capital market and for the CMU agenda through 
the lens of the EU’s current third country regulatory requirements for access and 
export, in a comparative and international context. The analysis adopts a legal-
institutionalist analysis of the third country rules and their effects. But any analysis 
of EU financial regulation almost inevitably calls for a mosaic approach, particularly 
where the governance area is contested, and law, politics, and different forms of 
economic organization are tightly inter-twined, as is the case with EU capital market 
regulation and its access and export rules. In probing how the EU’s rules and 
institutional structures governing third countries operate and how they might be 
transformed in the Brexit crucible, this discussion is accordingly informed by the 
comparative/international political economy literature on the governance of 
international financial markets and on international financial relations, and on how 
EU preferences on market access are formed. It also draws on the extensive 
functional/empirical discussions on how the EU capital market may develop post 
Brexit.  
After a contextual section two, section three considers the current regulatory 
requirements governing third country access to the EU capital market and their 
implications for CMU. Section four examines the evolution of equivalence-related 
techniques internationally for capital markets and how they might be relevant for 
the EU. Section five speculates as to how the EU’s equivalence arrangements for 
third countries are likely to develop, including in the context of an EU/UK Free 
Trade Agreement. Section six concludes. 
 
 
 
2. THE CONTEXT: THE UK AND CAPITAL MARKETS UNION - 
THE INVESTMENT BANKER TO THE EU 27 
 
2.1 MARKET CONDITIONS 
 
The CMU agenda is designed to strengthen the fund-raising capacity of the single 
EU capital market, to embed market-based finance, and to reduce the EU’s 
dependence on bank funding. It seeks to improve access to finance for firms, to 
diversify sources of funding beyond the currently dominant bank funding channel, 
and to achieve a more efficient and effective EU capital market.21 If CMU is 
achieved, its determinants will be many, complex, and interlocking - and they will 
extend beyond the liberalizing and regulatory reforms which are the EU’s traditional 
                                                      
 
21 CMU Action Plan n 11, 4-6.  
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means for achieving policy outcomes for financial markets and which are contained 
in the CMU agenda.22 
One determinant stands out. The success of the CMU agenda is in large part 
dependent on the nature of the settlement which will govern the future relationship 
between the UK and the EU. London has recently been identified as the leading 
global financial centre, beating New York, Hong Kong, Tokyo, and Singapore to 
the top spot.23 The highest other EU jurisdiction in the index - which measures 
business environment, financial sector development, infrastructure, human capital, 
and reputational factors -  is Luxembourg, coming in at number twelve.  The 
London market provides a pipe-line of finance to the EU, acting as the dominant 
supplier of wholesale market services. These wholesale services, including asset 
management, risk management and hedging business (derivatives services), dealing 
in securities, and broking, are of acute importance to the efficiency, liquidity, and 
stability of the EU capital market generally. They are all the more important as the 
depth and resilience of liquidity in the EU capital market is currently of significant 
regulatory and market concern. A range of factors, including market- and regulatory-
driven structural change to corporate bond markets, have led to concerns that 
liquidity is thinning and becoming more volatile, with related risks to the stability 
and efficiency of the EU capital market and to its ability to withstand shocks.24  
A plethora of recent Brexit-related reports has identified and quantified the 
extent to which the UK exports to the EU the wholesale financial services which 
support the efficiency, liquidity, and stability of the EU capital market.25 Among the 
headline figures are: over half of global financial firms have their European 
headquarters in London; 37% of assets under management in the EU are managed 
in the UK; and 46% of equity funding raised in the EU is raised in the UK.26 In the 
region of 25% of UK financial services revenue derives from EU international and 
wholesale financial services business.27 The UK Financial Conduct Authority has 
reported that over 5,000 UK firms ‘passport’ their services into the single market; 
some 2,250 passports cover the investment services critical for CMU.28  The UK is 
the home of the largest stock exchange in the EU and of the most developed 
                                                      
22 See Moloney, n 11. 
23 Z/Yen Group and China Development Institute, The Global Financial Centres Index 20, September 
2016. 
24 Including ESRB, Macroprudential Policy Issues arising from Low Interest Rates and Structural Changes 
in the EU Financial System (2016), and FCA, Market-based Finance: its Contributions and Emerging 
Issues, FCA Occasional Paper 18 (2016).  
25 These include: IMF, Financial Services Sector Assessment Program, Financial System Stability 
Assessment, IMF Country Report, UK (2016); The CityUK, The UK: Europe’s Financial Centre, August 
2016; K Lannoo, EU Financial Market Access After Brexit, CEPS Policy Brief, September 2016; Oliver 
Wyman, The Impact of the UK’s Exit from the EU on the UK-based Financial Services Sector (2016); and 
European Parliament, Briefing, M Magnus, A Margerit, and B Mesnard, Brexit: the United Kingdom and 
EU Financial Services, 9 December 2016.  
26 Briefing, n 25 (drawing on a range of sources). 
27 Wyman Report, n 25, 6.  
28 Letter from FCA Chairman Bailey to House of Commons Treasury Committee Chair Tyrie, 17 August 
2016. 
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derivatives market and related clearing and settlement infrastructures, and is a major 
centre for related services, including credit rating services and market data 
production and vending services.29 To take a specific example from the asset 
management sector, around 85% of European hedge funds are based in London; 
and from the trading sphere, some 74% of over-the-counter trading in interest rate 
derivatives, and 78% of foreign exchange trading, takes in place in London, while 
twice as many euros are traded in London as in the euro area.30 Overall, some 35% 
of all wholesale financial services activity in the EU takes place in the UK.31 Clearly, 
the UK/EU interdependencies go both ways. The focus of this assessment, 
however, is on the implications for the EU.  
Market-based finance is growing in the EU, 32 propelled by the complex array 
of drivers, including but not limited to facilitative regulation, which shape economic 
systems. An abrupt rupture between the UK and the EU 27 would disrupt this 
evolution, given the extent to which the UK provides wholesale investment services 
to the EU capital market.33 Strenuous policy and regulatory action was already called 
for by the CMU agenda given the scale of the effort required to embed market-
based finance in a predominantly bank-based economic system.34  Any obstruction 
of the pipe-line from London is likely to have material aggravating effects. This was 
acknowledged before and in the immediate aftermath of the Brexit vote. The 
Chairman of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) warned prior 
to the Brexit vote of the risks to CMU were the UK to leave the EU,35 while the 
Vice President of the Commission made pointed reference to the continued 
importance of the CMU agenda post Brexit in the immediate wake of the vote.36  
 
2.2 LEGAL REMEDIES 
 
Political calculations and market realities - regionally and, particularly given the 
changing posture of the US to international governance and trade relations, 
                                                      
29 Lannoo, n 25, 2. 
30 The CityUK, n 25, 3 and 4 (figures from 2015 in relation to hedge funds and 2013 in relation to trading). 
31 Ibid, 2.  
32 As has been charted by the Commission and the ECB: recently, Commission, European Financial 
Stability and Integration Review (SWD (2016) 146) April 2016, and ECB, Financial Integration in Europe 
(2016).  
33 Lannoo has suggested that the effects may include a reduced capacity within the EU to refinance funding 
requirements (n 25, 6) while a recent Bruegel study has suggested that the additional costs to the EU 27 of 
Brexit (beyond the losses from losing access to the UK market), assuming continuing fragmentation in EU 
financial markets, could be in the region of 0.05-0.1% of GDP:  A Sapir, D Schoenmaker, and N Véron, 
Making the Best of Brexit for the EU27 Financial System, Bruegel Policy Brief February 2017 (2017 Bruegel 
Report). 
34 ECB, Financial Integration in Europe (2016), 97. 
35 ESMA Chairman Maijoor warned ‘if the biggest capital market of the EU would not be part anymore of 
that CMU, obviously that would be detrimental’: H Jones, ‘Brexit would damage EU Capital Market Union: 
watchdog says,’ Reuters, 18 May 2016. 
36 The EU Commissioner charged with CMU stated in the wake of the vote that CMU was needed ‘more 
than ever’: Commissioner Dombrovskis, ‘Remarks at the Atlantic Council’, 18 July 2016. 
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internationally - will shape the future UK/EU settlement37 and thus CMU. But these 
forces will act on law and regulation, whether in the form of a bilateral UK/EU 
Free Trade Agreement or horizontal EU third country rules. In the short-term, a 
transitional arrangement may ease the impact of the UK’s departure, particularly if 
it is agreed over the Article 50 negotiating period. Beyond a transitional 
arrangement, the EU’s current access and export rules and related equivalence 
requirements, or a bespoke access/export arrangement based on these rules, will 
shape UK/EU relations. If neither a transitional arrangement or final bespoke 
agreement transpires (the ‘sharp Brexit’ option), the UK’s access to the EU capital 
market will be managed through WTO and GATS requirements. These trade rules 
will provide the UK, as a third country, with basic access rights for financial services, 
including in relation to ‘commercial presence’ (or the right to establish subsidiaries, 
for example).38 But they do not address the financial regulatory requirements which 
will apply. In effect, the EU’s current WTO/GATS commitments in relation to 
financial services retain the EU’s ‘right to regulate.’ This right to regulate takes 
expression in the third country/equivalence rules which govern financial regulatory 
requirements and which will replace the UK’s current passporting arrangements.  
As a member of the EU, the UK benefits from the EU’s unique ‘passporting’ 
arrangements which govern access by EU financial actors to the single market in 
financial services. Once authorized in its ‘home’ Member State (classically, the state 
where the actor is incorporated or registered), a financial actor can operate through 
branches or cross-border service provision based on home Member State regulation 
and supervision, with some limited exceptions. The ‘passporting’ access device, 
which is not replicated in any multilateral, regional, or bilateral grouping 
internationally, is based on the EU’s ‘single rulebook,’ a dense thicket of harmonized 
rules which governs the EU financial system and which allows host EU regulators 
to defer to supervision by the home regulator.  The passport is also based on the 
coordinated institutional support for supervision and risk management provided 
through the EU’s European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS). At the heart 
of the ESFS are the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) which are charged 
with a range of quasi-regulatory and supervisory coordination tasks in the banking 
(European Banking Authority - EBA); capital markets (European Securities and 
Markets Authority- ESMA); and insurance/pensions (European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority - EIOPA) spheres. The single rulebook and the 
ESFS together are designed to support market access, the removal of host state 
control, and the prevention, or at least management, of cross-border and system-
wide risks to financial stability, market integrity, and investor protection.  
‘Passporting’ derives from free movement rights and the Treaties and is only 
available to EU firms - firms which are registered (incorporated) in the EU. It is 
                                                      
37 Ferran, n 8. 
38 For extensive analysis see A Lang and C Conyers, Financial Services in EU Trade Agreements, Study for 
the ECON Committee (IP/A/ECON/2014-08) (2014). 
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possible that UK investment firms and infrastructures will deploy subsidiaries to set 
up operations in the EU 27, and thereby benefit, as EU actors subject to EU law, 
from passporting rights. The impact of any Brexit shock to CMU may therefore be 
reduced. An increasing tendency of financial actors to use subsidiaries given their 
effectiveness in supporting firms in shaping local business conditions to their 
preferences and in increasing market share39 is beginning to be noted in the 
literature. But subsidiarization is predominantly associated with the banking markets 
and less so with capital market actors such as asset managers, investment firms, and 
financial market infrastructures. Capital market actors will often access the single 
market by establishing host branches and/or by direct, cross-border service 
provision from the home Member State. Since the Brexit decision there are 
indications that major investment banks and infrastructures are planning to locate 
subsidiaries in the EU 27 for passporting business, and that EU Member States are 
actively seeking this business,40 while Frankfurt, Paris, Amsterdam, and Dublin have 
been identified as the major beneficiaries of a relocation of UK business.41  The 
months following the Brexit referendum have also seen some suggestions that the 
EU may use delaying tactics over the negotiations to maximize the likelihood that 
UK firms will relocate to the EU 27 if a lack of clarity on the EU/UK settlement 
persists.42  
Subsidiarization as a means for addressing UK access to the EU capital market 
has attractions for the CMU agenda, beyond its ability to keep the UK pipeline open. 
There is growing policy support for domestic/host subsidiary-based supervision, 
rather than remote/home supervision of branches and services. Under EU financial 
governance arrangements, subsidiaries are supervised in the relevant local market in 
which the subsidiary is registered. Branches and cross-border services are supervised 
remotely through the home Member State from which these service channels 
operate. The risk management benefits of domestic/host supervision are 
increasingly being highlighted, particularly in light of the incentives of local 
supervisors to protect financial stability.43 In addition, subsidiaries come within the 
EU’s fast developing supervisory coordination arrangements for financial groups, 
including the ‘colleges of supervisors’ which are overseen by the ESAs. By contrast, 
                                                      
39 On incentives for subsidiarization see Z Kudrna, ‘Governing the Ins and Outs of the EU’s Banking 
Union’ 17(1 and 2) Journal of Banking Regulation (2016) 119, and R Epstein, ‘When do Foreign Banks ‘cut 
and run’? Evidence from West European Bail Outs and East European Markets’ 21(4) Review of International 
Political Economy (2014) 847. 
40 The World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2017 saw a number of global banks make statements 
to this effect: M Arnold and P Jenkins, ‘Goldman Presses May to Protect City post-Brexit,’ Financial Times, 
30 January 2017. One major market, the Lloyd’s of London insurance market, has confirmed it will set up 
an EU subsidiary: J Ford, C Binham, and O Ralph, ‘Lloyd’s of London to Establish EU base in the New 
Year,’ Financial Times, 15 December 2016. In March 2017, AIG announced it was to set up a subsidiary in 
Luxembourg: O Ralph, ‘AIG to Set Up New Base in Luxembourg to Service EU Business,’ Financial Times, 
9 March 2017. 
41 2017 Bruegel Report, n 33.   
42 G Parker, ‘Fears EU Delays on Brexit Talks will Spur Exodus of Banks to Eurozone,’ Financial Times, 19 
December 2016. 
43 A Persaud, ‘The Locus of Financial Regulation: home versus host’ 86(3) International Affairs (2010) 637. 
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the supervisory risks and challenges posed to the local host supervisor by ‘systemic 
branches,’ supervised remotely by the home State, have recently come on to the EU 
policy agenda, with EBA consulting on guidelines to facilitate cooperation and 
coordination between supervisors.44 Norway, for example, has recently highlighted 
the supervisory challenges and risks which would be posed to its financial system 
were the largest foreign bank in its financial system, an EU subsidiary which 
represents nine percent of the Norwegian banking market and which is designated 
as a systemically important bank in Norway, to be transformed into a branch (as is 
permitted under EU/EEA law) and become subject to remote home supervision, 
and not local host supervision in Norway.45 The risks posed by such home-
supervised ‘systemic branches’ to the host market are all the greater where the 
branch is of a third country firm, such as a post Brexit UK firm, which operates 
outside the EU’s supervisory governance and coordination requirements.  
Subsidiarization is not, however, a cost-free strategy for UK firms.46 In 
addition to the operational disruption and potentially inflexible labour laws and 
taxation costs which may follow, it exposes firms to the full weight of EU regulation, 
including the ring-fenced capital and liquidity requirements which may be onerous 
for certain group structures. While the Commission has recently proposed an easing 
of the restrictions which apply to capital and liquidity management within EU 
financial groups,47 subsidiarization is unlikely to provide a complete solution for UK 
firms.  
There are other, less legally stable routes available. UK firms will have very 
strong incentives to deploy creative legal techniques to ensure their access to the 
EU market remains open, particularly as EU 27 clients and counterparties will likely 
assume that considerable market and legal ingenuity will be brought to bear in 
ensuring that any disruption to business is limited.48 UK firms could, for example, 
seek to use the EU access routes available for ‘reverse solicitation’ (or client-solicited 
investment-services business, noted in section three below) or use delegation 
methods to outsource UK-based business to an EU operation. These methods are 
not legally resilient, however, and could be vulnerable to challenge by the individual 
national regulators which will have jurisdiction over these access routes.  
The current third country access and export arrangements are accordingly 
likely to have significant implications for CMU and are considered below.  
 
 
                                                      
44 EBA, Consultation on Guidelines on Supervision of Significant Branches (EBA/CP/2016/24) (2016).  
45 Norwegian Ministry of Finance, Home/Host Issues for Significant Bank Branches, Letter to the 
European Commission, 21 November 2016. 
46 As has been repeatedly identified in the policy debate: eg, Norton Rose Fulbright, Brexit and Financial 
Services: 10 things you should know (Part II), October 2016. 
47 Commission, Proposal to Revise the Capital Requirements Regulation (COM (2016) 850) (2016). 
48 It has been reported that banks are planning on using the ‘workarounds’ which can be found in EU law 
to minimize Brexit shocks: M Arnold, ‘Banks Study Loopholes to Enable UK Branches to sell to EU 
Clients,’ Financial Times, 2 February 2017.  
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3. THIRD COUNTRY RULES, THE UK, AND CMU: ACCESS 
AND EXPORT IMPLICATIONS 
 
3.1 THE EQUIVALENCE REGIME 
 
Equivalence is a legal and procedural mechanism used to manage third country 
access to the EU capital market (access) and how EU market actors and 
counterparties interact with third country entities (export). The third country regime 
has several distinct features. While internationally-oriented, it is powered by single 
market technology. The regime is a function of single market legislation and deploys 
the EU’s supranational machinery, including the Court of Justice of the EU, the 
European Commission, and, at the administrative level, the ESAs. The regime has 
significant historical, political, and institutional legacy effects. It has been shaped by 
the shifting political and other interests which have shaped the single market in 
financial services more generally, as has been charted in the international political 
economy literature which examines the political and institutional dynamics of EU 
regulatory arrangements governing market access.49 In relation to national political 
preferences, whether or not Member States have been more or less in favour of 
competition and open markets, or more or less concerned with internal financial 
stability and with protecting national markets, has tended to shape their approach 
to the negotiation of third country regimes.50 The Member State debates have also 
been shaped by the immense variability in political preferences, reflecting the 
different interests at stake depending on the particular segment of the capital market 
engaged.51 The related debates are of very longstanding, tracking back to the early 
1990s when the single market in financial services was embryonic.52 Institutional 
factors have also been determinative. The strength of the EU’s regulatory capacity, 
or its ability to adopt and enforce rules, and to export those rules internationally, 
including through participation in the different ISSBs of international financial 
governance, has shaped its third country regimes and the extent to which they 
require third country actors to adhere to EU rules.53 So too have prevailing political 
and market conditions. The significant tightening of third country rules over the 
                                                      
49 For an early discussion of the pre-financial crisis approach of the EU to third country market access and 
the related interests which drove the predominantly liberal approach see A Dür, ‘Fortress Europe or Open 
Door Europe? The External Impact of the EU’s Single Market in Financial Services’ 18(5) Journal of 
European Public Policy (2011) 619. 
50 L Quaglia, ‘The Politics of ‘Third Country Equivalence’ in Post-Crisis Financial Services Regulation in 
the European Union’ 38(1) Western European Politics (2015) 167 (for a political economy perspective), and E 
Ferran, ‘After the Crisis: The Regulation of Hedge Funds and Private Equity in the EU’ 12 European Business 
Organization Law Review (2011) 379 (for a legal/institutionalist perspective). For a discussion of the distinct 
interests which drove the third country regime for investment services, eg, see N Moloney, EU Securities 
and Financial Markets Regulation (OUP, 2014) 403-404.  
51 Ferran, n 8. 
52 Lannoo, n 25, 4. 
53 A Newman and E Posner, ‘Putting the EU in its Place: Policy Strategies and the Global Regulatory 
Context’ 22(9) Journal of European Public Policy (2015) 1316, and Quaglia, n 14. 
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financial crisis era, and the related ‘export’ of EU rules internationally, has been 
associated with the distinct conditions of the crisis and the related politicization of 
financial regulation. This led to the previously dominant policy concern to minimize 
regulatory burdens internationally and to prioritize EU competitiveness losing 
traction.54  
It is not accordingly unexpected that the third country regime for capital 
markets is partial, complex, and lacking in coherence. Some capital market segments 
are subject to no or only very limited rules on third country access or on regulatory 
export. Reciprocity may or not be required for access. Registration by the third 
country actor with ESMA, and submission to ESMA supervision, may or not be a 
condition of access. The benchmarks against which equivalence (whether in relation 
to market access or rule export) is assessed vary. But while the third country rules 
vary very significantly, the procedural route to the pivotal equivalence determination 
is broadly similar. The Commission is typically (although not always) conferred with 
the power to initiate the equivalence process and the Commission’s power to adopt 
an equivalence decision is almost always discretionary. It makes the equivalence 
decision in the form of an administrative act, usually under the ‘examination 
procedure’ for administrative rule-making, derived from TFEU Article 291 (this 
procedure is ‘comitology’-based, using a committee to provide Commission 
oversight, and does not engage the Council and European Parliament).55 In a limited 
number of cases the TFEU Article 290 procedure for delegated acts is required 
(which is based on Commission oversight by the European Parliament/Council 
through the non-objection procedure). Technical advice is usually provided to the 
Commission by ESMA, which engages in an extensive assessment of the relevant 
jurisdiction. This step is not always specified in the relevant legislation, but as a 
matter of practice the Commission seeks ESMA’s advice. The Commission usually 
follows ESMA’s advice but will often engage in independent assessments of the 
relevant jurisdiction. The equivalence decision may be indefinite, time limited, full, 
or partial. It may include all the relevant financial governance elements of the third 
country regime, or only elements.  
The equivalence process is not transparent and only indications as to how it 
operates in the capital markets sector can be gleaned from Commission decisions 
on equivalence and from the related technical advice from ESMA. In its February 
2017 Report on Equivalence, however, the Commission shed some light on the 
process - although the salience of the report in light of the upcoming Brexit 
negotiations suggests that caution is needed in its interpretation. The Commission 
regards equivalence as a primarily EU-oriented process which is designed to 
facilitate EU actors in interacting with non-EU markets and counterparties. 
Assessments are outcomes-based and concerned with results, not ‘word for word 
                                                      
54 S Pagliari, ‘A Wall Around Europe? The European Regulatory Response to the Global Financial Crisis 
and the Turn in Transatlantic Relations’ 35(4) European Integration (2013) 391. 
55 Set out in Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 [2011] OJ L55/13. 
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sameness’ of legal texts.56 The principles of proportionality and of risk-based 
assessment guide the Commission in the exercise of its discretion in adopting 
equivalence decisions; its related assessment of the third country identifies the risks 
to the EU financial system and applies the equivalence criteria in a manner 
proportionate to the risks identified.57 The Commission has indicated that factors 
such as the size of the third country market, its importance to the functioning of 
the single market, the interconnectedness between the third country market, or the 
risks of circumvention of EU rules are all relevant to how the Commission exercises 
its discretion.58 The Commission will look beyond technical requirements and focus 
on regulatory objectives pursued and outcomes delivered, and has warned that an 
outcome is ‘not necessarily or automatically positive for the jurisdiction 
concerned.’59 The Commission has also underlined  that the equivalence decision is 
unilateral and discretionary and can be changed or withdrawn by the EU as 
necessary ‘at any moment.’60 In exercising its discretion the Commission takes into 
account objectives derived from the relevant legislation empowering it to adopt an 
equivalence decision and from the Treaty, and has highlighted the importance of 
protecting the financial stability and market integrity of the single market for 
financial services.61 
An examination of the main features of the third country regime as it applies 
to capital market regulation and of its implications for CMU follows.62 The 
discussion focuses on the type of services in which the UK is currently dominant 
and which are of most importance to the CMU agenda: investment services, 
including risk management and securities and derivatives trading; provision of 
financial market infrastructures (trading venues and central clearing counterparties 
(CCPs63)); and asset management. Investment services and infrastructures are 
governed by the two measures which provide the backbone of EU capital market 
regulation: (i) the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II)/Markets 
                                                      
56 2017 Commission Equivalence Report, n 9, 4. 
57 Ibid, 8. 
58 Ibid, 9. 
59 Ibid, 8. 
60 Ibid, 9. 
61 Ibid. 
62 The technical features of the EU’s third country requirements for financial services have been subject to 
exhaustive discussion in an extensive policy and industry literature (primarily but not exclusively from the 
UK) since the Brexit decision. Key industry papers include: International Regulatory Strategy Group. The 
EU’s Third Country Regimes and Alternatives to Passporting (2017); Shearman & Sterling, Brexit and 
Equivalence: Review of the Financial Services Framework Across All Sectors, August 2016; Ashurst, Brexit: 
potential impact on the UK banking industry (2016); and AFME and Clifford Chance, The UK 
Referendum – Challenges for Europe’s Capital Markets, March 2016. For a policy perspective see 
Commission, n 9 above, European Parliament, Briefing, A Duvillet-Margerit, M Magnus, B Mesnard, and 
A Xirou, Third Country Equivalence in EU Banking Legislation, 9 December 2016, and Report by MEP 
Annelise Dodds, Brexit: A New Deal for Financial Services, January 2016. 
63 CCPs manage ‘counterparty risk’ in derivatives contracts by ‘clearing’ transactions - or acting as a seller 
to every buyer and as a buyer to every seller. CCP clearing guarantees the performance of derivatives 
contracts and thereby reduces the financial stability risk to the financial system from derivatives contracts 
by containing the risks of a party to a contract defaulting. 
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in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR) (2014),64 the EU’s rulebook for 
investment services and trading venues which imposes extensive authorisation, 
prudential, and conduct regulation on a wide range of investment services providers 
and trading venues; and (ii) the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) 
(2012),65 which addresses the derivatives market and imposes a range of far-reaching 
obligations, including the pivotal requirement to ‘clear’ certain derivatives through 
CCPs, as well as reporting and risk management obligations. The limited third 
country rules which apply to collective asset management through investment fund 
vehicles (individual/discretionary asset management is covered under MiFID 
II/MiFIR) are set out in the UCITS Directive (2009)66 and the Alternative 
Investment Fund Managers Directive (2011).67 A range of other measures cluster 
around these core elements. For the most part these other measures apply third 
country rules which are primarily ‘export’ in nature and which govern how EU 
actors engage with third country actors.68 While many of these more ancillary 
measures are of significant operational importance to the EU capital market (they 
impose qualifications, for example, on acting as a ‘primary dealer’ (providing 
liquidity) in the EU sovereign debt market), this discussion will focus on the twin 
pillars of MiFID II/MiFIR and EMIR, and on the asset management regime.   
 
3.2 INVESTMENT SERVICES: MIFID II/MIFIR 
 
MiFID II/MiFIR, which comes into force in 2018, contains a new third country 
access regime69 for the provision of investment services (including dealing in 
securities, broking, underwriting, advice, and discretionary/individual asset 
management). Two forms of access route are covered: branches; and cross-border 
provision of services.  
A ‘third country firm’70 may, if permitted by the relevant national regulator, 
establish a branch in an EU Member State. Passporting rights are not granted to the 
branch which is subject to the rules imposed by the national regulator – although a 
Member State may not treat any third country branch more favourably than an EU 
firm (MiFID II Article 41(2) and recital 109). In some cases, a Member State may 
                                                      
64 Directive 2014/65 [2014] OJ L173/349 (MiFID II) and Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 [2014] OJ 
L173/84 (MiFIR). 
65 Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 [2012] OJ L201/1. 
66 Directive 2009/65/EC [2009] OJ L302/32 (as amended).  
67 Directive 2011/65/EU [2011] OJ L174/1. 
68 Including the Short Selling Regulation (2012) (Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 [2012] OJ L86/1); the 
Market Abuse Regulation (2014) (Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 [2014] OJ L171/1); the Securities 
Financing Transaction Regulation (2015) (Regulation (EU) No 2015/2365 [2015] OJ L337/1); and the 
Benchmark Regulation (2016) (Regulation (EU) No 2016/1011 [2016] OJ L171/1). 
69 The new third country regime is significantly more centralized than the MiFID I regime, including in 
relation to the introduction of a Commission power to determine equivalence and the imposition of 
harmonized rules in areas previously governed by Member State discretion.  
70 Defined as a firm that would be a MiFID II ‘credit institution’ providing investment services or 
performing investment activities or a MiFID II ‘investment firm’ if its head office or registered office was 
located in the EU (MiFID II, A 4(1)(57)). 
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require the establishment by a third country firm of a branch (where a firm may 
otherwise prefer to operate remotely through cross-border service provision) in 
which case a harmonized regime applies. Under MiFID II Articles 39-43 Member 
States may require that a third country firm intending to provide MiFID II 
investment services to, or engage in investment activities with, retail clients or clients 
who request to be treated as professional (elective professional clients),71 must 
establish a branch (Article 39(1)).72  If a Member State exercises this option for, in 
essence, retail-facing business, the establishment of the branch in the Member State 
in question is subject to harmonized requirements (Article 39(2)) including in 
relation to authorization; information; branch management ‘fitness and probity’ 
tests and capital; a range of ongoing conduct and operational requirements which 
map the requirements of MiFID II/MiFIR; and conditions relating to supervisory 
coordination with the third country supervisor and the third country’s compliance 
with OECD rules governing exchange of information on taxation.   
The mandatory branch regime, where it applies, is cumbersome. It does not 
require an equivalence determination by the Commission, but it imposes a series of 
procedural and regulatory requirements, including the unusual imposition of capital 
requirements on a branch (capital requirements typically apply to subsidiaries). Most 
significantly, it does not support passporting; it only allows the provision of services 
from the branch within the jurisdiction in question. In practice, these limitations are 
unlikely to disrupt CMU. The UK’s critical role in relation to capital market 
intermediation relates to the wholesale investment services it provides to the EU 
27, and not to the retail-oriented business which branches are often associated with 
and which the MiFID II branch requirements are directed towards. The CMU 
agenda certainly promotes retail market investment, but retail capital markets in the 
EU are under-developed and primarily domestic in nature,73 and the UK has not 
been a significant supplier of cross-border retail services. To the extent EU-27 retail 
clients require services from the UK, the ‘reverse solicitation’ route is available. 
Branch requirements do not apply where a retail or elective professional client 
initiates at its own exclusive initiative the provision of the service/activity, but the 
firm cannot market new investment products/services to the client (MiFID II 
Article 42). Under EU law, an investment service of this type is not deemed to be 
provided within the territory of the EU. This route does not, however, provide a 
stable legal platform for EU access as its availability depends on the local rules of 
                                                      
71 ‘Retail clients’ are those clients which do not meet the MiFID II eligibility conditions for ‘professional’ 
clients and for ‘eligible counterparties’ and include individuals as well as local and regional authorities. The 
‘professional client’ and ‘eligible counterparty’ classifications cover large corporates as well as regulated 
financial institutions. Elective professional clients are retail clients who meet identified eligibility conditions 
related to experience and size of investment portfolio and who can choose to be treated as professional, 
following an approval process. 
72 The Commission originally proposed a mandatory branch requirement, but this was resisted in the 
Council by some Member States as being overly restrictive of cross-border business: Moloney, n 50, 404. 
73 For a recent assessment see Commission, Green Paper on Retail Financial Services (COM (2015) 630) 
(2015).  
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the EU 27 with respect to the nature of a ‘reverse solicitation’, and there have long 
been indications that an aggressive approach by third country firms will not be 
tolerated by EU regulators.74 The MiFID II branch regime may, however, become 
significant as a means for supporting the cross-border supply of wholesale market 
intermediation services from a single hub, as discussed below in relation to the 
cross-border services access route.   
Of significantly greater importance to the CMU agenda is the extent to which 
the parallel cross-border services regime (MiFIR 46) facilitates access by UK firms 
providing wholesale market services remotely from the UK. MiFIR Article 46 
covers services provided remotely by third country firms, without a branch, to 
eligible counterparties and professional clients (non-retail business). This regime 
provides an EU passport once the conditions of the regime are met, but is 
dependent on the third country firm registering with ESMA. ESMA registration is 
subject to a series of conditions (Article 46(2)), chief among them that the 
Commission has adopted an equivalence decision in relation to the relevant third 
country. In addition, the firm must be authorized to provide the proposed EU 
services/activities in the jurisdiction where its head office is established, and be 
subject to ‘effective supervision and enforcement ensuring full compliance with the 
requirements applicable in that third country’. Supervisory cooperation 
requirements must also be in place.  
At the heart of Article 46 is the Commission third country equivalence decision 
(which is governed by Article 47). This decision must provide that the ‘legal and 
supervisory arrangements of that third country ensure that firms authorized in that 
third country comply with legally binding prudential and business conduct 
requirements which have equivalent effect to the requirements set out in [relevant 
EU law, including MiFID II/MiFIR]’ and that the third country provides for an 
‘effective equivalent system’ for recognition of investment firms authorised under 
third country legal regimes (a reciprocity condition). Prudential and business 
conduct rules ‘may’ be considered equivalent where a series of conditions are met: 
firms are subject to authorization and ‘effective supervision and enforcement’ on an 
ongoing basis; firms are subject to ‘sufficient’ capital requirements and ‘appropriate’ 
requirements applicable to shareholders and management body members; firms are 
subject to ‘adequate’ organizational requirements in relation to internal control 
functions; firms are subject to ‘appropriate’ conduct of business rules; and the third 
country ensures market transparency and integrity by preventing market abuse in 
the form of insider dealing and market manipulation.  
The equivalence decision-making process is articulated in some detail. The 
decision is at the Commission’s discretion (Article 47) and is carried out under the 
‘examination process’ for Commission administrative decision-making (Article 51).  
In carrying out the assessment the Commission should have regard to the IOSCO 
Objectives and Principles (recital 41) - a reference to the core standards adopted by 
                                                      
74 Norton Rose Fulbright, MiFID MiFIR Series, October 2014, 3. 
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the major ISSB for capital markets.75 The assessment should be outcome-based and 
assess the extent to which the third country regulatory and supervisory framework 
achieves ‘similar and adequate regulatory effects’ and to what extent it ‘meets the 
same objectives as EU law’ (recital 41). Equivalence decisions should only be 
adopted if the third country legal and supervisory framework provides for ‘an 
effective equivalent system’ for the recognition of investment firms authorised 
under foreign legal regimes (a reciprocity condition) (recital 44). The initiation of 
the equivalence assessment is at the Commission’s initiative (recital 41), although 
Member States should be able to indicate their interest that certain third countries 
are assessed (without such an indication being binding on the Commission) (recital 
41). In addition, the Commission and the Member States should prioritize the areas 
covered by G20 commitments and agreements and by agreements with the EU’s 
largest trading partners. They should also have regard to the central role the EU 
plays in wholesale financial markets and ensure that the application of third country 
requirements does not prevent EU investors/issuers from investing in/obtaining 
funding from third countries, or prevent third country investors/issuers from 
investing, raising capital, or obtaining other financial services in EU markets, ‘unless 
that is necessary for objective and evidence-based prudential reasons’ (recital 41). 
The Commission should be able to prioritise among third country jurisdictions, 
taking into account the materiality of the equivalence finding to EU firms/clients; 
the existence of supervisory/cooperation arrangements; the existence of an 
effective equivalence system in the third country; and the interest and willingness of 
the third country to engage in the equivalence assessment process (recital 41).  
The process is designed to be dynamic. The Commission is to assess whether 
the conditions under which the equivalence decision is made ‘continue to persist’ in 
relation to the third country (Article 49(3)) and the Commission is to monitor any 
significant changes to the regulatory/supervisory framework of the third country 
and ‘review equivalence decisions where appropriate’ (recital 41). Accordingly, 
provision is made for the decision to be withdrawn (Article 47(4)). 
Once the third country firm is registered, a pan-EU passport becomes 
available, and the firm cannot be required to establish branches (Article 46(1)). In 
addition, relevant services can be based in an EU branch of the third country firm 
and, in effect, benefit from a ‘wholesale passport’ (Article 47(3)). A MiFID II Article 
39 branch of a firm from a third country jurisdiction which is declared equivalent 
under MiFIR can provide services/activities to eligible counterparties/default 
professionals in other EU Member States (where the activities in question are 
covered by the Article 39 authorization). Accordingly, the Article 39 retail-oriented 
branch can be used as hub from which to provide wholesale services pan-EU.  
As is the case for the branch regime, the requirements of the MiFIR Article 46 
route can be avoided where the services flow from a ‘reverse solicitation’ (Article 
                                                      
75 IOSCO, Objectives and Principles for Securities Regulation (2010). 
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41(5)), but the same legal uncertainties apply, significantly limiting this option as a 
stable platform for providing wholesale services to the EU 27. 
 
3.3 THE MIFID II/MIFIR EQUIVALENCE CHALLENGE 
 
The MiFIR Article 46 regime provides a legal platform for the provision of 
wholesale market intermediation services from the UK, as a third country, to the 
EU 27. There is no evidence yet on its operation as it does not come into force until 
2018. But there are structural weaknesses in this platform which could have 
potentially serious implications for the provision of essential capital market 
intermediation services to the EU 27.  
There are timing challenges.  The regime applies to ‘third country firms’ and 
third countries. UK firms and the UK will not acquire this status until the UK leaves 
the EU. A cliff edge may therefore arise: the equivalence process cannot start until 
the UK leaves the EU, and the process may take some time. Certainly, there are 
mitigating factors. Initiation of the equivalence process is at the Commission’s 
discretion and it is unlikely to postpone a decision which has important implications 
for the EU capital market. This is all the more the case as recital 41 directs the 
Commission to ensure that EU investors and issuers are not prevented from 
accessing third country funding without objective and evidenced prudential cause. 
On ‘Brexit Day One’, the UK will be able to show regulatory equivalence, meaning 
the ESMA and subsequent Commission equivalence processes should, at least for 
regulatory matters, be straightforward, given the longstanding embedding of UK 
financial governance within EU financial governance. In addition, the EU may 
consent to ‘shadow’ equivalence discussions, and related ESMA registration 
preparations, taking place over the Article 50 negotiation period so that the 
equivalence decision can be activated on ‘Day One’.76 Alternatively, a provisional 
equivalence assessment may be provided for in a transitional arrangement, assuming 
one can be negotiated and finalized by the end of the Article 50 process.77 The 
required supervisory and cooperation agreements should also be relatively 
straightforward to negotiate given the extensive supervisory coordination activities 
the UK has engaged in, and the related cooperation and information exchange 
processes it has constructed, as required under EU capital markets law and following 
from its participation in ESMA’s wide-ranging supervisory convergence activities. 
These will need to be adjusted, given that the UK as a third country will no longer 
be a member of ESMA and participate in its supervisory coordination, cooperation, 
and information exchange activities, but the framework for a new operating model 
is in place. 
                                                      
76 As has been called for by an influential UK parliament committee: House of Lords, n 1, para 58. UK 
MEP Annelise Dodds has called for equivalence determinations to be automatic in relation to current 
equivalence provisions: n 62.  
77 C Grant, Brussels Prepares for a Hard Brexit, Insight, Centre for European Reform, 21 November 2016. 
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On the other hand, Commission sympathy cannot be assumed. The tone of its 
2017 Equivalence Report is forthright and contains little to suggest it will entertain 
any special pleading by the UK. It has underlined that while third countries may 
express an interest in being assessed, an equivalence empowerment does not confer 
a right to be assessed or to receive a positive determination. The Commission has 
also stated in forthright terms that ‘the decision is a unilateral and discretionary act 
of the EU, both for its adoption and any possible amendment or repeal.’78 Other 
obstacles are in the way. While the Commission is the decision-maker on 
equivalence, the ‘examination’ rule-making process which applies to equivalence 
decisions engages national political interests. Commission decision-making is 
overseen by the European Securities Committee, which is composed of national 
representatives and which operates under a qualified majority vote; it can veto the 
Commission’s draft equivalence decision.79 The European Parliament and Council 
must also be kept informed of deliberations.  The EU-27 and the UK have strong 
incentives to ensure their financial markets remain open. But if the wider Brexit 
process becomes fraught, it cannot be assumed that the equivalence process will not 
be politicized. This is even more a risk as it is now clear that many Member States 
see Brexit as a competitive opportunity for their capital market sectors. In the 
absence of a Commission equivalence decision, Member States can choose to allow 
provision of MiFID II/MiFIR services/activities within their territories in 
accordance with their national regimes (MiFIR Article 46(4)). It remains to be seen 
how Member States will weigh the benefits which access to UK wholesale 
investment services brings against the potential competitive gain to their local 
markets, particularly if an equivalence vacuum leads to major UK firms setting up 
subsidiaries in the EU 27 and if the economic benefits outweigh the potential risks. 
Member States can be expected to facilitate access where it is in the interests of their 
capital markets, but there is an inherent instability in MiFIR Article 46 as a platform 
from which market intermediation services can be channelled from the UK to the 
EU. 
There are further challenges. The equivalence assessment may prove 
technically problematic. The equivalence conditions are expressed in high-level and 
open terms which afford the Commission very significant discretion. Assuming a 
workmanlike environment, the requirement that the process be outcome-based 
augurs well for smooth decision-making. But if political conditions deteriorate, the 
benefits of facilitating UK access may be trumped by other considerations and 
Commission/European Securities Committee decision-making may become a 
vehicle for obstructionism.  The Commission’s recent underlining of the need for 
‘high impact’ markets to be subject to rigorous review may not augur well for the 
UK.80 Dynamism is a material difficulty, as is indicated in the Article 50 letter. On 
                                                      
78 2017 Commission Equivalence Report, n 9, 8. 
79 The complex procedures are set out in Regulation 182/2011 (Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 [2011] OJ 
L55/13). 
80 2017 Commission Equivalence Report, n 9, 12. 
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‘Day One’ the UK will be able to show regulatory equivalence, particularly as the 
UK government has indicated that the ‘Great Repeal Act’ which will come into 
force on the day the UK leaves the EU will carry over the corpus of EU law. But 
UK law will start to diverge – sooner rather than later. There is considerable pressure 
for and expectation of at least some regulatory reform.81 A range of factors, 
including the need for an equivalence determination on Brexit, competitiveness 
concerns, and obligations to comply with ISSB standards, will shape any de-
regulatory response by the UK. But even allowing for only minimal deregulation, 
EU capital markets law is continually updated and revised, particularly at the 
administrative level. Even without material change in the UK, the two regimes will 
almost certainly start to diverge. Considerable instability will be injected into the 
functioning of the EU capital market if the UK equivalence decision becomes 
subject to the risk of withdrawal by the Commission. The Commission has pointedly 
noted in its 2017 Equivalence Report that an equivalence decision can be changed 
or withdrawn as necessary ‘at any moment’ and that monitoring of equivalence may 
require ongoing monitoring of supervisory practices.82 It has also underlined the 
discretionary nature of its equivalence powers and that a positive outcome cannot 
be assumed.83 With sufficient political commitment (from both the UK and the 
EU), and an imaginative approach, it may be possible to design a new and more 
stable equivalence system which incorporates regulatory dynamism and addresses 
ongoing monitoring, as is suggested in section five below.  But it is very unlikely 
that a new EU equivalence regime could be adopted prior to Brexit. A bespoke 
EU/UK regime, set out in a Free Trade Agreement, could be agreed, but it may run 
the risks of violating the ‘most favoured nation’ obligation which applies under the 
GATS - although the exemption which applies for mutual recognition arrangements 
will likely be helpful.84  
Other aspects of the equivalence regime may prove problematic if political 
conditions deteriorate. Difficulties may arise in relation to the supervisory and 
enforcement aspects of the MiFIR equivalence assessment. Benchmarks for 
supervisory and enforcement equivalence are notoriously difficult to design given 
the elusive and typically locally-specific factors which shape supervision and 
enforcement strategies.85 In a politically benign environment, the equivalence 
assessment could be formulaic as the UK’s supervisory and enforcement apparatus 
has long formed a critical part of EU financial governance, providing the 
supervisory anchor to the provision of wholesale cross-border investment services 
                                                      
81 The MiFID II/MiFIR requirements on commodity position limits, equity market transparency, and 
liquidity thresholds governing non-equity market transparency requirements, eg, have been identified as 
targets for deregulation: Ashurst, n 62, 9. 
82 2017 Commission Equivalence Report, n 9, 9 and 12. 
83 Ibid, 8. 
84 See further Lang and Conyers, n 38. 
85 H Jackson, ‘Substituted Compliance: the Emergence Challenges and Evolution of a New Regulatory 
Paradigm’ 1 Journal of Financial Regulation (2015) 169, and J Coffee, ‘Law and the Market: the Impact of 
Enforcement’ 156 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (2007) 229. 
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to the EU from the UK. If political conditions are not so benign, the distinct aspects 
of UK supervision and enforcement (its risk-based approach; its reliance on 
administrative, rather than criminal, enforcement, to take two examples) could be 
deployed to lengthen or complicate equivalence decisions.  
The implications for CMU go beyond UK market access, however. If 
equivalence difficulties arise they may compromise the ability of EU firms to 
transact with UK counterparties and on UK financial market infrastructures given 
that equivalence qualifications govern how EU capital market actors interact with 
third country actors. One of MiFIR’s key reforms requires that trading by authorized 
investment firms in certain securities takes place on authorized trading venues, 
reflecting the G20 commitment to moving the trading of derivatives from the over-
the-counter (OTC) market to regulated venues, as well as EU-specific concerns to 
move share trading to transparent trading venues. MiFIR requires that shares (which 
are admitted to a trading venue) and identified classes of derivatives must be traded 
on authorized EU trading venues (MiFIR Articles 23 and 28) - third country trading 
venues qualify if they are assessed as equivalent. Under the relevant equivalence 
rules for share trading, the Commission can adopt a decision that the venue’s third 
country is equivalent if the third country ensures that the venue complies with legally 
binding requirements equivalent to identified EU rules governing trading venues, 
and is subject to effective supervision and enforcement. The derivatives trading 
regime is similar. A Commission equivalence decision is required determining that 
the legal and supervisory framework of the third country ensures that a trading 
venue authorized in the third country complies with legally binding requirements 
equivalent to identified EU requirements which are subject to effective supervision 
and enforcement in the third country. 
Finally, consumer-protection-oriented equivalence requirements govern the 
sale of particular classes of financial instrument. Under MiFID II Article 25(4) 
certain instruments qualify for ‘execution-only’ distribution (in that they can be sold 
without investment advice) where they are traded on a third country trading venue 
which is equivalent to an EU ‘regulated market’ – the most heavily regulated form 
of EU trading venue. The MiFIR Article 23 share trading equivalence assessment 
governs this assessment.   
These ‘export’-related equivalence requirements under MiFID II/MiFIR are 
similar to those which apply to investment firm access, and are subject to 
Commission decision-making and the examination procedure. In some respects, 
they are less troublesome than the access requirements. First, Member States are 
empowered to activate the Article 23 MiFIR and Article 25 MiFID II share trading 
equivalence assessments. If Member States are incentivized sufficiently, the process 
may proceed more quickly than a Commission-initiated process. On the other hand, 
given that the initiative lies with the Member States, the extent to which CMU and 
EU capital market effects will be moderated will depend on how the Member States 
balance the risks of their firms being prevented from trading on UK trading venues 
against any benefits associated with driving trading to local, EU 27, or other 
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equivalent venues. Second, there is less Commission discretion in this area. A share 
trading equivalence decision must be made where the equivalence requirements are 
met and the relevant procedure is followed (MiFID II, Article 25(4)(a) and MiFIR 
Article 23). Similarly, the equivalence regime governing the trading of derivatives on 
third country trading venues provides that a regime ‘is’ equivalent when the 
identified conditions are met. In other ways, however, the export rules are more 
restrictive. The derivatives trading regime, for example, applies to a very wide set of 
actors: the derivatives trading obligation applies to financial counterparties and non-
financial counterparties generally, and not only to regulated entities. In a benign 
political environment, the MiFID II/MiFIR export rules should not be problematic, 
but if the equivalence process does not work smoothly EU actors will be prevented 
from executing transactions on the UK’s major, liquid trading venues, including 
those of the London Stock Exchange Group. Concomitant risks arise for CMU and 
the EU capital market, including with respect to weaker risk management, thinner 
liquidity, and higher transaction costs. 
Finally, MiFID II/MiFIR is incomplete regarding third country access. It does 
not cover, for example, third country investment firm access rights to market 
infrastructures (trading venues and CCPs), or give third country trading venues the 
right to provide trading screens in the EU 27. Neither does it cover access rights for 
third country investment firms and trading venues to EU-authorized market-data 
services-providers. If access of this nature is disrupted, the stability, liquidity, and 
efficiency of the EU capital market is likely to be compromised.   
 
3.4 INFRASTRUCTURE: EMIR 
 
The second set of third country rules which are critical for CMU are set out in 
EMIR. EMIR imposes a series of obligations which have re-organized derivatives 
trading in the EU, chief among them the G20-derived requirement that certain 
classes of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives86 must be cleared through CCPs 
authorized in the EU. This new obligation has placed CCPs at the epicentre of the 
EU derivatives market: vast volumes of derivatives transactions are cleared through 
EU CCPs. The EMIR derivatives clearing obligation works in tandem with the 
MiFIR derivatives trading obligation, with the result that legally frictionless access 
by trading venues to CCPs, and by CCPs to trading venues, is of critical importance 
to the smooth operation of the EU derivatives market.  Frictionless access to UK 
CCPs is similarly important: the four authorized UK CCPs (CME Clearing Europe, 
                                                      
86 Defined as derivatives which are not admitted to trading on an EU ‘regulated market’ (the most heavily 
regulated classification of EU trading venue). The Commission, following technical advice from ESMA, 
determines which classes of OTC derivatives are subject to the clearing obligation. Under a parallel regime, 
MiFIR imposes a clearing obligation on identified classes of derivatives which are admitted to trading on 
regulated markets (A 29). Equivalence requirements apply to when a third country venue can be regarded 
as equivalent to an EU regulated market. 
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ICE Clear Europe, LCH.Clearnet, and LME Clear87) are major providers of clearing 
services in derivatives to the EU 27, with LCH.Clearnet a market leader in euro-
denominated clearing of derivatives.88 
EMIR permits third country CCPs to provide clearing services under EMIR, 
subject to an equivalence determination being made. Given the reach of the EMIR 
CCP clearing obligation, the consequences for a third country such as the UK if it 
not considered equivalent under EMIR are many and stark. They include that a third 
country CCP cannot have EU members (EMIR, Article 25); cannot provide clearing 
services for EU trading venues on which derivatives trade (Article 25); and cannot 
provide clearing for EU investment firms in instruments which are subject to the 
clearing obligation (Article 25). In addition, under EU capital adequacy rules EU 
investment firms and banks are required to hold more capital against exposures to 
third country CCPs in jurisdictions not determined to be equivalent. The 
consequent risk of the fragmentation of ‘clearing pools’ across UK and EU 27 
CCPs, and of the related significant transaction costs and potential risks to financial 
stability which might arise if difficulties emerge with the UK equivalence decision, 
have frequently been raised as a particular challenge of Brexit.89 
Further consequences follow from the complex interaction between EMIR’s 
derivatives clearing requirements and MiFIR’s derivatives trading rules. Under 
MiFIR, a finding of equivalence is a precondition for a third country trading venue 
having access to an EU CCP (and thus being able to trade instruments subject to 
the EMIR clearing obligation and cleared through an EU CCP), as well as for third 
country CCP access to an EU trading venue (Article 38). A trading venue established 
in a third country can request access to an EU CCP only when an equivalence 
decision (in accordance with MiFIR Article 28, noted above) is adopted. Similarly, 
a CCP established in a third country can request access to an EU trading venue only 
when it has been through the equivalence process under EMIR. To take a final 
example, MiFIR contains a mechanism for alleviating the erga omnes effect of the 
derivatives trading and clearing obligations (which apply to financial counterparties 
and non-financial counterparties within and outside the EU) where one 
counterparty is established in a third country which has been found equivalent in 
accordance with the specified conditions (Article 33).  
The equivalence system for third country CCPs, which should moderate the 
risk of Brexit-related disruption to the EU derivatives market, is set out in EMIR 
Article 25. It empowers the Commission to adopt an equivalence decision 
determining that the legal and supervisory arrangements of a third country ensure 
that CCPs authorized in that third country comply with legally binding requirements 
equivalent to EMIR; that CCPs are subject to effective supervision and enforcement 
                                                      
87 See Bank of England, Recognized Clearing Houses, available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Pages/fmis/supervised_sys/rch.aspx#B02. 
88 U Batsaikhan, Brexit and the UK’s Euro-denominated Market: the role of clearing houses, Bruegel Blog 
Post, 7 June 2016. 
89 Eg Lannoo, n 25, and House of Lords, n 1, paras 66-75. 
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in the  third country on an ongoing basis; and that the legal framework of the third 
country provides an effective equivalent system for the reciprocal recognition of 
CCPs from other countries. Other conditions apply to the equivalence 
determination, including that supervisory cooperation arrangements are in place. 
 
3.5 THE EMIR EQUIVALENCE CHALLENGE 
 
By contrast with the MiFID II/MiFIR equivalence regime, there is considerable 
evidence of how the EMIR equivalence regime works in practice. The procedure 
appears to be working relatively well, with ten jurisdictions deemed equivalent in 
relation to difference aspects of EMIR, including the pivotal CCP requirements, by 
the Commission, including Australia and the US (although in relation to US 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) rules only90). It is not, however, 
speedy - the Commission’s CCP equivalence decision on Australia followed some 
13 months after ESMA’s advice.91 The US equivalence decision posed the most 
challenges, being partially agreed only in early 2016, following the conclusion of 
difficult negotiations which signal the difficulties which Brexit-related equivalence 
decisions may experience.92 Elsewhere, however, there are grounds for optimism. 
The evidence suggests that ESMA, who advises the Commission on EMIR 
equivalence decisions, has been outcomes-focused, pragmatic, and proportionate in 
assessing CCP regimes internationally, drawing extensively on compliance with 
international standards and open to accommodating distinct national approaches 
where they achieve similar outcomes to those sought by EMIR.93  
Nonetheless, the general difficulties associated with equivalence 
determinations cannot be discounted in relation to Brexit. This is all the more the 
case as political and institutional interests are particularly acute in this area and 
extend beyond the technicalities of equivalence determinations. The dominance of 
the UK as the EU centre for the trading and clearing of euro-denominated 
instruments has been a source of contention for some time, culminating in the UK 
successfully challenging the ECB’s ‘location policy’ for euro-denominated 
derivatives clearing which required that such clearing take place in the euro area and 
be subject to ECB liquidity support.94 Recent indications from the ECB suggest a 
                                                      
90 Both the US Securities and Exchange Commission and the CFTC have jurisdiction over derivatives 
trading. 
91 ESMA/2013/1159, September 2013, and Commission Implementing Decision 2014/755/EU, 30 
October 2014. 
92 Commission, Press Release IP/16/807, 15 March 2016 and Commission/US CFTC, Common Approach 
for Transatlantic CCPs, 10 February 2016. It has been reported that while the technical experts reached a 
positive conclusion on equivalence fairly speedily, the political process slowed down the negotiations very 
considerably: House of Lords, n 1, paras 49-50. 
93 As is clear from its advice on the Australian regime: ESMA/2013/1159. ESMA stated that the ‘capability 
of the regime in the third country to meet the objectives of the EU Regulation is assessed from a holistic 
perspective’ and that the analysis of difference was carried out ‘as factually as possible.’  
94 Case T-496/11, European Central Bank v UK, 4 May 2015. 
  
Niamh Moloney                   Brexit, the EU and Its Investment Banker 
 
 
 27 
concern to re-establish this policy;95 certain Member States, in particular France, 
also support repatriating euro-denominated clearing to the euro area.96  
The risks of disruption may, however, be moderated. Given the importance of 
UK CCPs to the EU capital market and the disruption to the EU derivatives market 
which an abrupt rupture with the UK market would cause, the EU and UK are likely 
to seek a workable arrangement. Conversely, and assuming significant market 
disruption, the currently contingent nature of the EMIR equivalence regime brings 
benefits to CMU and the EU capital market in that the Commission can withdraw 
an equivalence decision if unusual conditions arises such that the financial stability 
of the EU capital market is threatened. These could arise through supervisory 
failure, for example, where the risks which a third country CCP posed to the EU 
were not appropriately addressed by the third country supervisor. While third 
country CCPs must be registered with ESMA under EMIR, ESMA does not 
exercise supervisory powers. It is unlikely, however, that UK supervision would not 
appropriately address EU-located risks, particularly as it has been a member of the 
EMIR colleges of supervisors which coordinate supervision of EU CCPs. 
 
3.6 ASSET MANAGEMENT AND EQUIVALENCE CHALLENGES 
 
The implications are similarly material in relation to the asset management of 
collective investment funds in respect of which the UK is the EU’s largest centre, 
although in this market segment EU access is not governed by an equivalence 
assessment. Of the two pillars of EU collective investment fund regulation one, the 
UCITS Directive (which is concerned with ‘UCITS’ funds - very broadly, retail-
oriented funds), does not provide for a third country access or equivalence regime. 
A UK authorized UCITS fund would automatically be reclassified as a third country 
‘alternative investment fund’ (AIF) on Brexit. It would accordingly become subject 
to the cumbersome market access rules of the Alternative Investment Fund 
Managers Directive (AIFMD) (which is, very broadly, concerned with more 
complex, wholesale-oriented funds), which currently links EU market access to the 
particular local requirements which apply in each Member State and which does not 
provide for a passport. UK UCITS funds could accordingly no longer be marketed 
on a pan-EU basis and EU investor access to investment opportunities could be 
obstructed.  The UCITS Directive does, however, provide for the delegation of 
some functions to third country providers, which provides a means for channelling 
some UK services to the EU 27.  
                                                      
95 ECB President Draghi has been reported as calling for ECB oversight of post Brexit, UK-located clearing 
business: J Brunsden, ‘ECB Steps Up Warning on UK-based Euro Clearing after Brexit,’ Financial Times, 23 
January 2017. Consequent changes would be required to the competence of the ECB in this area as the 
UK’s successful challenge was based on the ECB not having the power to adopt a euro area location policy. 
On the issues engaged see Financial Services Negotiation Forum, Euro-clearing and Brexit. The 
Practitioners’ View, January 2017. 
96 A Barber and J Brunsden, ‘EU Plan to curb City’s Euro Clearing set to be Flashpoint in Brexit Talks,’ 
Financial Times, 16 December 2016. 
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For UK funds in the form of non-UCITS funds (or AIFs) the access rules of 
the AIFMD would apply on Brexit. These requirements are not based on 
equivalence, but on authorization within the EU.  Complex authorization rules 
currently govern the access rights of third country AIF fund managers and AIFs. At 
present access is governed by national law which can be highly restrictive and which 
exposes third country funds and managers to authorization requirements in each 
jurisdiction in which access is sought.97 Provision is made under the AIFMD for a 
pan-EU passport, which is based on authorization in one EU Member State, full 
compliance with the AIFMD regime, and co-operation arrangements. The 
availability of such a single EU authorization as an access route is subject to complex 
timing rules and procedures set out in the AIFMD, which include approval by the 
Commission. Although ESMA has issued its technical advice on which third 
countries would qualify for this form of passporting,98 the Commission has yet to 
decide whether a passport can follow on authorization. In the absence of such a 
passport, post Brexit a UK AIF will only be permitted to be marketed in individual 
EU markets in accordance with relevant local rules, and it will not be possible for 
an EU AIF to be managed by UK fund managers. While delegation of function 
routes are available for some fund management activities under the AIFMD, the 
disruption of fund management activities in the EU capital market cannot be 
discounted.   
 
3.7 OTHER MEASURES 
 
A range of other measures also bear on CMU. Some are less material. The 2003 
Prospectus Directive (soon to be replaced by the 2017 Prospectus Regulation99), 
which addresses the prospectus disclosure requirements for offerings of securities, 
provides for equivalence assessments to be made by the Commission of third 
country prospectus requirements and for the consequent lifting of EU 
requirements.100 In practice this equivalence regime is not material to CMU or the 
EU capital market.  Offerings of securities to professional investors, which provide 
investment and risk management opportunities for the EU capital market and which 
support funding to the real economy, mainly occur through ‘private placements’ 
which are usually exempt from the EU prospectus regime and in relation to which 
France and Germany are, in any event, major EU centres.101 The 2012 Short Selling 
Regulation contains a more material equivalence regime as it governs the third 
country market-makers who support liquidity in securities dealing in the EU. Third 
country market-makers benefit from a range of exemptions under the Regulation, 
                                                      
97 Clifford Chance, Brexit – Assessing the Impact on Asset Managers, April 2016. 
98 ESMA, Advice to the European Parliament, the Council, and the Commission on the application of the 
AIFMD passport to non-EU AIFMs and AIFs (ESMA/2016/114) (2016). 
99 Agreement was reached by the Council and Parliament on the reforms in December 2016. 
100 Directive 2003/71/EC [2003] OJ L345/64, A 20. 
101 Commission, n 32, 29-30. 
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including from its more onerous provisions, but their availability depends on an 
equivalence assessment.   
The EU’s current third country regime has accordingly several weaknesses 
which limit its ability to provide a stable legal platform on which EU/UK regulatory 
relations post Brexit could be based, and which may, depending on the progress of 
the EU/UK negotiations, compromise the CMU agenda.   
 
 
 
4. MANAGING ACCESS AND EXPORT: THE INTERNATIONAL 
CONTEXT 
 
4.1 MANAGING ACCESS AND EXPORT AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
GOVERNANCE 
 
International financial governance provides something of a potential way-map for 
the EU as it starts to chart its post Brexit relationship with the UK. As regulation, 
supervision, and enforcement have become increasingly complex and divergent 
internationally, a series of access-related arrangements have developed - although 
the extent to which they are based on equivalence varies. The way-map which these 
arrangements provides is also partial as it reflects the distinct preferences of the 
states concerned, the features of the relevant markets, and the institutional capacities 
of the regulators involved.102 A comparative review can accordingly only identify 
features which may be of use to the EU, given the very significant transplantation 
challenges.   
The current setting for international financial governance is not particularly 
conducive to the development of equivalence-based access/export regimes. Prior 
to the financial crisis, international financial relations were often framed in terms of 
access, liberalization, and competition, reflecting the pre-crisis zeitgeist which 
privileged markets and which was sympathetic to the market’s ability to self-govern. 
This dynamic is well-illustrated by the pre-crisis change in the posture of the US - 
the classic ‘great power’ in international finance in terms of its ability to shape 
international finance governance103  - towards market access. The pre-crisis era saw 
the US calibrate its generally restrictive posture towards market access by adopting 
                                                      
102 On the preferences engaged see, from a legal-institutionalist perspective, P-H Verdier, ‘Mutual 
Recognition in International Finance’ 52(1) Harvard International Law Journal (2011) 56, and, for an 
international political economy perspective, P Knaack, ‘Innovation and deadlock in global financial 
governance: transatlantic coordination failure in OTC derivatives regulation’ 22(6) Review of International 
Political Economy (2015) 1217. 
103 On the influence exerted by major markets as ‘great powers’ see the classic account by Drezner: D 
Drezner, All Politics is Global: Expanding the Reach of International Regulatory Regimes (Princeton University Press, 
2007). International financial governance is typically regarded as being shaped by a range of different 
preferences, including those of the domestic regulators who influence the national ‘great powers’ but who 
also drive the distinct preferences of the ISSBs. 
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a series of reforms designed to ease market access in order, in part, to address 
growing concern as to a reduction in the attractiveness of the US as a capital market 
to overseas financial actors following the reforms adopted in the wake of the Enron-
era equity market crisis.104 These liberalizing reforms included the first tentative 
steps towards a more facilitative approach to market access by means of  new 
‘substitute compliance’ mechanism (as noted below).105 This predominantly liberal 
framing of international financial relations changed over the crisis-era. This period 
saw the securing of global financial stability through collective institutions and the 
adoption and oversight of common standards become the major preoccupation of 
international financial relations. The G20 reform agenda dictated the outline shape 
of reforms internationally and central steering in relation to the amplification and 
implementation of the reforms - through standard adoption and the monitoring of 
standard implementation -  was provided by the ISSBs, notably the FSB. An 
extensive international political economy and international financial regulation 
literature canvasses the drivers of this change.106 Notwithstanding this movement 
towards greater standardization, as the financial stability imperatives of the crisis-
era have receded it has become clear that difference and divergence still characterize 
international financial governance. As international standards have been adopted, 
they have been filtered through national systems to reflect national interests and 
have diverged.107 There are few incentives to concede national supervisory control 
given the complexities and costs associated with the allocation or sharing of related 
fiscal risk which the financial crisis exposed: the EU’s Banking Union, forged at a 
moment of existential crisis for the euro area, remains a striking exception with its 
risk-sharing mechanisms. Enforcement remains a distinctly national affair, shaped 
by deeply entrenched national legal, institutional, and cultural dynamics.108 The 
resulting system has been well described as a system characterized by ‘mutual 
adaptation’ and ‘co-operative de-centralization’.109 In the absence of effective means 
through which the quality of the foreign/third country system can be assessed and 
ensured there are few incentives for regulators to allow market access on the basis 
                                                      
104 The loss of competitiveness was initially charted in the Paulson Report (Committee on Capital Markets 
Regulation, Interim Report (2008)). A subsequent and lively policy and academic debate queried whether 
US regulatory policy was a factor in the decline of US market attractiveness and competitiveness and if 
such a decline was real.  
105 See eg Jackson, n 85, and R Karmel, ‘The EU Challenge to the SEC’ 31 Fordham International Law Journal 
(2008) 1692. 
106 See eg E Helleiner, S Pagliari, and H Zimmerman (eds), Global Finance in Crisis (Routledge, 2010), and D 
Mugge, Europe and the Governance of Global Finance (OUP, 2014). 
107 A classic example concerns the EU’s implementation of the Basel III agreement, which led to a finding 
of ‘materially noncompliant’ under the Basel Committee’s review of EU implementation: Basel Committee, 
Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme (RCAP), Assessment of Basel III Regulation – European 
Union, December 2014. On the divergence between the EU and US approaches to Basel implementation 
see K Young, ‘Tying Hands and Cutting Ties: Explaining the Divergences Between the EU and US in 
Global Banking Reforms since the Crisis’ 17 (1-2) Journal of Banking Regulation (2016) 46.  
108 See, eg, the survey by IOSCO: IOSCO, Credible Deterrence in the Enforcement of Securities Regulation 
(2015). 
109 Helleiner and Pagliari, n 19. 
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of foreign rules or to limit the export of their standards to transactions which may 
impact on their markets.110   
Verdier has characterized the core challenge relating to market access and 
export as an enforcement one: how can states and their regulators be prevented 
from exploiting opportunities under access and export arrangements and from 
evading their reciprocal obligations, particularly given the difficulties in verifying 
compliance?111 The challenge is all the greater as to date there has been no delegation 
to the collective international institutions of international financial governance (the 
ISSBs) to monitor access/export arrangements, although IOSCO is showing some 
enthusiasm for such a delegation. Its Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) on Consultation, Cooperation and Information Exchange (2012) can act as 
a template for related cooperation arrangements, while its Principles Regarding 
Cross-Border Supervisory Cooperation (2010) similarly support supervisory 
cooperation. More generally, the array of standards which IOSCO has adopted can 
support negotiations on access and export arrangements. Most recently, IOSCO has 
adopted a wide-ranging report on market access arrangements which is designed to 
inform its members of the different design choices available.112  
Two forms of device are usually deployed by regulators internationally to deal 
with market access and rule export. First, under the host state control approach or 
‘national treatment’, financial actors (registered in their home state – in EU parlance, 
the third country) are simply subject to the regulatory and other governance 
requirements of the host country in which they provide cross-border services, 
although different forms of exemption or special treatment may be available. 
Engagement with the actor’s home country is limited. While national treatment 
increases transaction costs for the third country actor, it supports a level playing 
field domestically and minimizes the regulatory risk to the local market. It also 
facilitates market access as exemptions may be available for the third country actor 
in appropriately justified circumstances.113 These exemptions are typically not 
related to an assessment of the relevant home jurisdiction, however. National 
treatment is commonly applied by regulators globally, in a range of sectors, and in 
developed and emerging markets.114 
Second, under what can be termed a ‘deference’ model, some form of 
deference to the home state (third country) where the financial actor is authorised 
and supervised is engaged in. This is typically achieved through an equivalence 
                                                      
110 On the difficulties in comparing and assessing regulatory regimes, particularly in relation to supervision 
and enforcement, see, eg, Coffee, n 85, and H Jackson, ‘Variations in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: 
Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications’ 24 Yale Journal on Regulation (2007) 101. 
111 N 102. 
112 IOSCO, Task Force on Cross Border Regulation. Final Report (FR/23/2015). 
113 In the US, eg, ‘foreign private issuers’ of securities are eligible to provide required disclosures under a 
tailored US SEC arrangement which imposes very similar requirements as those which apply to non-eligible 
issuers, but which contains certain accommodations, notably in relation to the availability of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) financial reporting standards as an alternative to US GAAP reporting 
standards.  
114 IOSCO n 112, 7. 
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assessment which leads to some form of mutual recognition (whether in relation to 
access or rule export). Under this model, an administrative process is put in place 
through which the home (third country) and host regulators ‘mutually recognize’ 
their respective regulatory regimes following an assessment process.115 The nature 
of the equivalence assessment varies. It can examine, for example, the ‘adequacy’, 
‘suitability,’ or ‘equivalence’ of the other regime. Equivalence assessments can be 
formal and limited to rules only or they can cover supervision and enforcement 
(what is usually termed ‘substitute compliance’). The latter assessment can be limited 
to an examination of the formal powers of supervisors or extend to how powers are 
used, including in relation to the risk tolerance of the supervisor and the resources 
at its disposal. The reach of the assessment can be (and usually is) limited to distinct 
financial sectors (such as fund-raising, brokerage, or asset management) and to 
discrete market segments (usually the professional markets to minimize the risks to 
the relevant regulators from major retail market failures). The equivalence 
assessment is typically outcomes-based, and not focused on a granular, line-by-line 
comparison of rules. The measures used to evidence the achievement of outcomes 
are varied but often include analyses of the relevant home/third country rules and 
the nature of the relevant legal system; levels of investor protection (including, for 
example, redress arrangements such as dispute resolution and compensation 
schemes); the enforcement capability of the home regulator; levels of supervisory 
oversight; the legal framework governing international co-operation; the outcomes 
of standardized assessments carried out by the IMF and/or the ISSBs; and 
membership of international/regional organizations. The typical model leads to 
host state registration of the actor in question who is then eligible for a range of 
exemptions from host state regulation. The extent to which the host regulator relies 
on home/third country supervision and enforcement varies, although host states 
will often retain enforcement power in identified areas. Detailed cooperation and 
information-sharing arrangements typically underpin the equivalence/mutual 
recognition arrangement. Reflecting the dynamism of financial governance, the final 
agreement will generally also include notification mechanisms under which both 
states commit to informing the other of significant changes to their regulatory 
regimes which may have a material impact on the mutual recognition/equivalence 
arrangement. In some cases, the relevant states/regulators conduct a full assessment 
every 4-5 years, while others rely on notification arrangements to assess the ongoing 
viability of the arrangement. Overall, administrative and institutional structures are 
thin: assessment, agreement, and monitoring are typically carried on a peer-to-peer 
basis by the regulators engaged.  
The equivalence/mutual recognition method has several benefits.116 It is not 
dependent on multilateral agreement or exposed to related defections. It preserves 
                                                      
115 The recurring themes of mutual recognition regimes internationally have been reviewed recently by 
IOSCO. Ibid. 
116 This para draws on the extensive review by Verdier, n 102. 
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differentiation between regulatory regimes and useful experimentation. From the 
host state perspective, it supports subsidiarity in that the host regulator can dictate 
the regulatory outcomes for the local market. It also facilitates access to the host 
state market, signalling its openness to foreign business, and thereby can deepen 
funding sources and diversification/risk management opportunities.117 From the 
home state perspective (the third country), it limits the regulatory disruption to 
home state actors, providing (depending on how the administrative process is 
designed) legal certainty and the potential for some transaction cost reduction. But 
there are significant risks and costs. IOSCO has described the challenge as how ‘to 
ensure that potential solutions do not weaken the effectiveness of domestic 
regulation while, at the same time, not unduly constraining the cross-border offering 
of financial services or products.’118 The scale of this challenge has led to there being 
relatively few examples of mutual recognition/equivalence regimes for capital 
markets internationally. The following, non-exhaustive analysis identifies the major 
examples relating to the capital market intermediation services which are essential 
to CMU and which may hold lessons for the EU.   
 
4.2 INVESTMENT SERVICES 
 
Mutual recognition/equivalence regimes governing investment services are rare 
internationally. To take an example from a smaller market, the Malaysian Temporary 
License Framework, established in 2009, uses an equivalence assessment to grant 
exemptions from local rules.119 Bilateral in nature, it permits individuals regulated 
by a foreign (home/third country) regulator to carry on regulated activities in 
Malaysia for short six-month periods where the individual is licensed or approved 
in the home jurisdiction, the regulation of the foreign licensed company in question 
is ‘sufficiently equivalent’ to the Malaysian regulatory framework, and cooperation 
arrangements apply. The regime is limited in scope, applying only to corporate 
finance and investment advice to institutional and sophisticated clients in Malaysia.  
By contrast, the US - the major global capital market - has not adopted a mutual 
recognition/equivalence arrangement for investment services, usually following a 
national treatment approach which is moderated by exemptions.120 This approach 
reflects the jurisdiction of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) over 
investment services and trading venues and its longstanding suspicion of third 
country regulatory, and particularly supervisory and enforcement, standards, which 
can be related to the deep imprinting of its investor protection mandate on the 
                                                      
117 The ‘TransTasman’ mutual recognition regime which supports securities offerings by issuers in New 
Zealand and Australia by providing for mutual recognition of prospectus offer documents is regarded as a 
success, being credited with cost savings from 55% to 95% for firms and with accelerating the prospectus 
approval process: IOSCO, n 112, 15.  
118 Ibid, 1. 
119 Malaysia Securities Commission, Temporary License (with reference to Licensing Handbook). 
120 See Jackson, n 85. 
                           5/2017 
 
 34 
agency.121 The SEC has, for example, been resistant to equivalence-related 
arrangements for the placing or  establishment of trading screens by foreign/third 
country trading venues in the US, imposing a national treatment approach.122 By 
contrast, the US CFTC, which has jurisdiction over the commodity derivatives 
markets (which have a wholesale market orientation), has adopted a more liberal 
approach to the placing of trading screens for commodity derivatives trading in the 
US. It has adopted a bilateral, equivalence-based approach, contingent on an 
equivalence assessment and based on CFTC registration of the foreign trading 
venue.123 The CFTC permits such screens (subject to home/third country 
regulation, supervision, and enforcement but CFTC registration) where the foreign 
trading venue is subject to comprehensive supervision and regulation by appropriate 
governmental authorities that is comparable to comprehensive supervision and 
regulation under CFTC rules and US law. The pivotal equivalence determination is 
based on a ‘principles-based review’. The CFTC will look to determine if the foreign 
government authorities support and enforce regulatory objectives that are 
‘substantially equivalent’ to the regulatory objectives supported and enforced by the 
CFTC. The equivalence regime also deals with dynamism, providing that an annual 
certification must be made by the trading venue in question (not the home/third 
country regulator) that there has been no material change to the home regulatory 
system. Where such change has occurred, this is grounds for revocation if the 
change alters the CFTC registration conditions. These registration conditions 
include that the trading venue adheres to appropriate rules on abusive trading 
practices, is authorized by a regulatory process that examines customer and market 
protections, and is subject to continued oversight by a regulator that has the power 
to intervene in the market and has authority to share information with the CFTC. 
There were, however, indications prior to the financial crisis of a more liberal 
approach from the US SEC to mutual recognition/equivalence assessments of 
regulatory regimes governing trading venues (and broker/dealers). The ‘substitute 
compliance’ model proposed by the SEC in 2007 is the most closely examined of 
mutual recognition/equivalence models internationally.124 It represented at the time 
a major departure from the SEC’s national treatment approach and exemplified the 
more liberal, competition-driven approach which characterized much of 
international financial relations prior to the financial crisis. It did not prove to have 
traction as the financial crisis intervened, but it merits consideration as the 
‘substitute compliance’ approach it adopted to equivalence assessments is 
potentially powerful and has since been adopted for other market segments, notably 
in relation to market infrastructures (as outlined below). Originally proposed by two 
                                                      
121 See generally D Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk (OUP, 2016). 
122 See Verdier, n 112, and Jackson, n 85. 
123 Under Part 48 of the Federal Regulations on Commodities and Securities Exchanges.  
124 See, eg, H Jackson, ‘A System of Selective Substitute Compliance’ 48 Harvard International Law Journal 
(2007) 103, and E Pan, ‘A European Solution to the Regulation of Cross Border Markets’ 2 Brooklyn Journal 
of Corporate, Financial and Commercial Law (2007) 133. 
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senior SEC officials in a 2007 journal article,125 the ‘substitute compliance’ model 
called for a more liberal approach to market access to facilitate retail investors in 
diversifying their portfolios and to enhance market access to the US. The new model 
was characterized by its proponents as a ‘significant departure’ from SEC practice 
but as a logical response to internationalization and to the need to reduce the costs 
of access to foreign investments in the US. The new model was to be bilateral and 
reciprocal in nature and to support exemptions from SEC regulation. The 
preferences driving it were clear: it was designed to facilitate US access to services 
and products which would not otherwise be available. The new model adopted a 
light-touch approach and did not provide for dispute resolution mechanisms; 
compliance was to be achieved through self-monitoring and notices to the relevant 
home (third country) and host regulators. The core ‘substitute compliance’ 
assessment was characterized as requiring evidence that US investors would be 
comfortable assuming any additional risks entailed, given supervision of the third 
country actor by a regulator with oversight powers and an enforcement philosophy 
substantively similar to the SEC’s. The substitute compliance assessment would 
assess the ability of the foreign regulator to achieve the objectives of US law, so that 
the SEC would not be in violation of its mandate relating to investor protection and 
support of strong markets. It would include examination of general legal and 
enforcement capability as well as specific requirements relating to the relevant 
market sector. Substitute compliance determinations would be underpinned by 
agreements on cooperation and on sharing enforcement and supervisory 
information. Monitoring was specifically provided for: a five-year review of 
comparability ‘in depth and de novo’ would follow and both host and home (third 
country) regulators would have discretion to review the arrangement at any time 
following a substantial change.  
The SEC’s substitute compliance model did not come to fruition. The SEC 
entered into only one mutual recognition arrangement, with the Australian capital 
markets regulator (ASIC), in 2008,126 following which the financial crisis intervened 
and the SEC re-trenched. The practical elements of the SEC/ASIC arrangement are 
nonetheless instructive.  The arrangement acknowledged that ‘core securities 
regulatory principles’ and the ‘manner these principles are given effect via 
regulation’ had been assessed (how was not made clear), and that the assessment 
recognized that regulations may appropriately be tailored to different markets and 
reflect different philosophies.127 The arrangement dealt with regulatory dynamism 
by means of a commitment by each party that it would ‘endeavour to inform’ the 
other of pending regulatory changes that might have significant impact and of 
                                                      
125 E Tafara and R Peterson, ‘A Blueprint for Cross Border Access to US Investors: A New International 
Framework’ 48 Harvard International Law Journal (2007) 31. 
126 The elements (adopted on 25 August 2008) included: an SEC/ASIC Mutual Recognition Arrangement 
under which the SEC and ASIC agreed a framework to consider exemptions from regulation in their 
jurisdictions; an Enhanced Enforcement MoU; and a Supervisory MoU. Exploratory talks with Canada and 
the EU foundered because of challenges raised by their federal/supranational decision-making structures. 
127 SEC/ASIC, Mutual Recognition Arrangement, Item Five. 
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material events and operational changes. Operationally, the SEC and ASIC were to 
keep each other informed of changes, on notification the other regulator could 
request a meeting to consider whether changes were required, and the arrangement 
would be reviewed in full every five years, following which the regulators could 
mutually decide to renew or modify. Notably, either regulator could terminate with 
60 days’ written notification.128 The ASIC/SEC arrangement was based on an 
eligible authorized financial actor being registered in the relevant home/third 
country jurisdiction and being eligible for exemptions in the host state – a degree of 
host autonomy was therefore maintained.  In practice, no exemptions were issued 
and the arrangement was subsequently rolled into ASIC’s new mutual recognition 
system (outlined below). Along with the substitute compliance model, the SEC 
around this time also committed to review the highly complex exemptions available 
for foreign broker-dealers under US law.129  
The most advanced and wide-ranging mutual recognition/equivalence regime 
for financial services more generally appears to be that of ASIC, the Australian 
markets regulator. Under ASIC’s bilaterally-oriented regime, where an equivalence 
assessment of the relevant home/third country has been adopted, an exemption 
from licensing requirements and ongoing regulation becomes available for foreign 
financial services providers, in respect of their wholesale clients.130 ASIC has 
adopted a series of ‘class orders’ under which identified classes of financial actor 
regulated by the UK Financial Conduct Authority, the US SEC and CFTC, the 
German Bafin, and the Hong Kong and Singapore regulators are eligible for 
exemptive relief.131 This mutual recognition/equivalence arrangement has its roots 
in the earlier 2008 ASIC/Australian Treasury consultation which explored in some 
detail the different policy options available for market access and related mutual 
recognition/equivalence frameworks. The consultation related mutual recognition 
to the notion of ‘substantial equivalence’ and proposed reforms to the (then) 
governing ASIC principles for recognition decisions and for the application of 
related discretions and exemptive relief.132 The subsequent, highly articulated 
approach to mutual recognition/equivalence was set out in an ASIC Regulatory 
Guide which is based on a series of General and Equivalence Principles.133 The core 
General Principle 1 provides that ASIC recognizes overseas (third country) 
regulatory regimes that are ‘sufficiently equivalent’ to the Australian regulatory 
                                                      
128 Ibid, Item Six. 
129 The exemptions were available in very limited circumstances where foreign broker-dealers had limited 
contact with the US market and only engaged with sophisticated US investors.  
130 ASIC, Principles for Cross-Border Financial Regulation, Regulatory Guide 54 (2012), and ASIC 
Regulatory Guide 176 (2012). 
131 ASIC, Information Sheet 157, Foreign Financial Services Providers – Practical Guidance (2015). The 
class orders continue to evolve. In November 2016 exemptive relief was extended to specified classes of 
fund manager regulated by the Luxembourg CSSF (ASIC, 16-401MR Relief for Foreign Financial Service 
Providers from Luxembourg).  
132 ASIC/Australian Treasury, Joint Consultation Paper, Cross Border Recognition, Facilitating Access to 
Overseas Markets and Financial Services, ASIC CP No 98 (2008). 
133 ASIC, Regulatory Guide 54, n 130. 
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regime in relation to the degree of investor protection, market integrity, and 
reduction of systemic risk that they achieve. The Principle makes clear that the 
related equivalence assessment by ASIC is to be ‘outcomes-focused’ and will not 
necessarily involve a comparison of the regulatory mechanisms used to achieve 
outcomes. ‘Sufficiently’ is tied to the degree of deference sought; if only limited 
exemptive relief is sought, the degree of equivalence required will be more limited. 
The other General Principles state that ASIC will give the ‘fullest possible 
recognition’ to sufficiently equivalent regimes and, accordingly, will limit the 
application of its rules as a host state; cover cooperation and enforcement in that 
they require that ASIC must have effective cooperation arrangements with the 
relevant overseas/third country regulatory authority and must be able to enforce 
Australian laws that apply to the relevant foreign actors (which may be achieved 
through conditions on a license), and that adequate rights and remedies must be 
‘practically available’ to Australian investors and clients; and address disclosure, 
requiring that adequate disclosure must be made to Australian investors of the 
information they might reasonably require to make an informed assessment of the 
consequences of differences between Australian and the relevant foreign country 
rules. The related equivalence assessment by ASIC is governed by four Equivalence 
Principles which provide that: an equivalent regulatory regime is clear, transparent, 
and certain (in that it is not subject to indiscriminate change); consistent with the 
IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation; adequately enforced in 
the home/third country jurisdiction; and achieves ‘equivalent outcomes’ to the 
Australian regulatory regime. Specific principles govern the equivalence of 
outcomes in discrete market sectors, including markets, financial services, and 
financial products. The mutual recognition system is not supported by a dedicated 
institutional structure to monitor arrangements, but the relevant third 
country/home authorities must be committed to the arrangement; timely and 
effective cooperation is required during negotiation and assessment; and authorities 
must be willing to enter into enhanced effective cooperation agreements.  
 
4.3 INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
Market infrastructures, such as trading venues and CCPs, have also been the subject 
of mutual recognition/equivalence arrangements internationally. As noted above, 
the US CFTC uses a ‘substantial equivalence’ test to assess whether foreign trading 
screens for commodity derivatives trading can be established in the US and be 
eligible for exemptions from CFTC regulation. In Latin America, the Mercado 
Integrado Latinoamericano (MILA) integrates the stock markets of Chile, 
Columbia, Mexico, and Peru and allows investors to trade through registered 
brokers who can access the common MILA trading platform to execute trades in 
securities in any of the four MILA member stock markets. MILA member 
jurisdictions have entered into a related mutual recognition arrangement which 
supports the operation of the integrated trading platform, although the issuers listed 
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on the four exchanges and brokers are authorized and supervised by their home 
authorities.134  
Recently, most attention has focused on mutual recognition/equivalence 
arrangements for CCPs. These often very new arrangements have been shaped by 
the sweeping regulatory reforms required internationally under the G20 crisis-era 
reform agenda for derivatives markets. Despite the extensive international standards 
which have been adopted to embed the reforms, significant difficulties have been 
generated by the resulting duplicative and sometimes conflicting regulatory regimes 
worldwide which reflect strong and differing national preferences on how the 
international standards are applied.135  Calls for greater efforts to achieve ‘deference’ 
in this area have come from the FSB and the G20, 136 and related progress is being 
monitored by the FSB which has called for greater transparency on how 
jurisdictions approach related equivalence assessments. The deference 
arrangements which are slowly being adopted are concerned to a much greater 
extent with reducing the extra-territorial impact (export) of domestic requirements 
on cross-border derivatives transactions than with traditional market access. They 
have also been politicized to a much greater than other mutual 
recognition/equivalence arrangements given the significant distributional effects 
associated with the reforms.137  
US/EU negotiations on CCP mutual recognition/equivalence arrangements, 
for example, were fraught, even though the CFTC, which regulates CCPs, applies a 
substitute compliance model. In March 2016, the CFTC approved a substitute 
compliance agreement for CCPs authorized in the EU, following a highly contested 
and delayed equivalence agreement between the European Commission and the 
CFTC on CCP regulation and a related Comparability Determination by the 
CFTC.138 This followed ‘extensive analysis’ by the CFTC and Commission of the 
differences between CFTC and EU regulation and their significance. Following the 
agreement, EU-authorized CCPs must be registered with the CFTC but can follow 
EU requirements in certain significant respects, in accordance with the CFTC’s 
Comparability Determination.  
Substitute compliance arrangements are also used to manage the export of the 
related US rules which (implementing the G20 reform agenda) impose risk 
management requirements on derivatives transactions more generally.139 The SEC 
regime (for transactions in security-based swaps), adopted in 2014, provides that 
                                                      
134 IOSCO, n 111, 14. 
135 See further Knaack, n 102. 
136 A G20 September 2013 statement called for deference by regulators where it was justified by the quality 
of regulatory and enforcement regimes: G20 Leaders’ Declaration, September 2013, para 71. 
137 Knaack, n 102. 
138 CFTC, Press Release PR7342-16, 16 March 2016. 
139 On the highly complex requirements see A Artamonov, ‘Cross-Border Application of OTC Derivatives 
Rules: Revisiting the Substitute Compliance Approach’ 1 Journal of Financial Regulation (2015) 206 and P 
Architzel, D Berkovitz, G Bernstein, S Davis, and T Serafini, ‘Dodd Frank Implementation Update: Key 
Differences between the CFTC and SEC Final Business Conduct Standards and Related Cross-Border 
Requirements’ 17(3) Journal of Investment Compliance (2016) 31.  
  
Niamh Moloney                   Brexit, the EU and Its Investment Banker 
 
 
 39 
certain transactions/actors (not all) are exempted from certain (not all) SEC 
requirements where a finding of substitute compliance is made in that the 
foreign/third country regulatory regime is ‘comparable’ based on an assessment of 
regulatory outcomes in respect of four regulatory categories.  The SEC’s substitute 
compliance assessment is designed to be holistic and outcomes-based140 and 
includes an assessment of the effectiveness of supervision and enforcement. A 
finding of substitute compliance can be withdrawn by the SEC after a ‘notice and 
comment’ period and is subject to periodic review. The parallel CFTC regime (for 
commodity derivatives) is similarly based on a substitute compliance assessment and 
follows a comparability-based and holistic approach which is concerned with 
regulatory outcomes.  
 
4.4 ASSET MANAGEMENT/INVESTMENT FUNDS 
 
There are very few examples of mutual recognition/equivalence arrangements 
relating to investment funds internationally. Singapore applies a (unilateral) 
recognition arrangement under which the Singaporean regulator will only 
‘recognize’ (a precondition for market access) a foreign/third country fund if the 
laws and practices of the foreign jurisdiction, including with respect to investor 
protection and the operation of the fund, provide Singaporean investors with 
protection at least equivalent to that provided under Singaporean regulation.141 The 
stand-out example is the recent ‘Asia Region Funds Passport’, a multilateral mutual 
recognition/equivalence regime relating to funds which is applied by Australia, 
Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand. The passport is designed to support cross-
border offerings of eligible funds – in effect, to construct a single market for 
managed funds.142 It is supported by a Memorandum of Cooperation (2016) and a 
related Framework Document143 which sets out the operational detail. Its scope is 
limited to identified authorized funds, primarily those with a retail focus. The core 
obligation is for member jurisdictions, to the fullest extent possible, to recognize 
and respect the integrity of their respective regulation. Authorization in the relevant 
host state is required but an expedited process applies which reflects the passport’s 
‘stepped approach’ which allocates regulatory competence between regulators. Host 
rules apply in certain areas, notably where there is direct interaction between the 
fund and investors (such as disclosure and distribution/marketing requirements). A 
category of harmonized ‘passport special rules’ governs streamlined authorization 
by the host state as well as several areas which are sensitive for host regulators, 
                                                      
140 The SEC has stated that its approach is to ‘focus on whether the foreign regime achieves regulatory 
outcomes that are comparable to [those sought by US law] rather than basing the ultimate determination 
on a rule-by-rule comparison’: SEC, Fact Sheet, Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities, 1 May 2013. 
141 IOSCO, n 112, 13. 
142 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Statement of Understanding on the Establishment of the Asia 
Region Funds Passport. 
143 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Statement of Intent on the Establishment of the Asia Region 
Funds Passport, Appendix B, Asia Region Funds Passport Framework Document. 
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including the funds which qualify for the passport and rules governing fund 
delegation and custody arrangements. The home state is allocated all other rules, 
including those governing initial fund authorizations. Specific institutional 
arrangements apply in the form of a Joint Committee of member regulators which 
monitors the operation of the passport, recommends amendments, and assesses 
applications from jurisdictions for membership. 
 
4.5 LEARNING FROM INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE 
 
Several themes can be identified from the mutual recognition/equivalence regimes 
applied to capital market access (and rule export) internationally. They tend to be 
sector-specific, focusing on distinct market segments. They are usually bilateral - 
multilateral/regional arrangements are few and far between with the Asia Region 
Funds Passport a rare example of a multilateral arrangement. They are still relatively 
uncommon internationally, with the EU single market passport far and away the 
most advanced and extensive form of mutual recognition/equivalence arrangement 
internationally.144 Regimes have been shaped by different preferences and legacies 
and are not easily transplantable. Different approaches are taken to equivalence, 
although outcomes-based approaches are common. Whether regimes require host 
state registration similarly varies. There is no single template internationally on 
which the EU could base a new mutual recognition/equivalence regime designed to 
accommodate the specific risks raised by Brexit for capital markets and for CMU 
and to accommodate EU and UK preferences. No regime internationally is as wide 
in scope as the EU’s current (admittedly problematic) third country regime. No 
regime has institutional support or monitoring mechanisms of the type which a 
wide-ranging EU/UK arrangement would likely require.  
But there are nonetheless useful lessons for the EU from the range of 
challenges which these arrangements have posed to their contracting parties. 
Examples are available of how equivalence is assessed, the benchmarks which are 
used, and the types of proxies (including international standards) which can be 
deployed. Examples are also available of how monitoring can be achieved, whether 
through notification requirements or formal review arrangements. Perhaps the most 
salient lesson is the one from the evolution of these arrangements: the US SEC 
substitute compliance model did not survive the financial crisis, underlining that 
access and export equivalence arrangements must be made resilient to financial 
market disruption. Engagement with supervisory coordination and cooperation and 
with supervisory equivalence -  and not simply regulatory equivalence - must 
accordingly be a feature of any new EU arrangement. 
                                                      
144 There are other examples of passporting, most notably the Canadian passporting arrangements which 
reflect the similarities in regulation across Canada’s federal regulatory system and which provide that 
prospectus approval, applications for exemptions by regulated actors, and authorizations for dealers and 
advisers across the different Canadian provinces and territories can be approved by the relevant home 
regulator. See further IOSCO, n 112, 36. 
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5. BUILDING A NEW MODEL: THE EU PERSPECTIVE        
AND A PROPOSAL 
 
5.1 COMPETING VISIONS OF EQUIVALENCE 
 
Calls for a bespoke mutual recognition/equivalence arrangement to govern access 
and export, as part of a EU/UK Free Trade Agreement, are becoming increasingly 
frequent in the UK. ‘TheCityUK’, a leading lobbying group, has called for ‘a 
framework for the mutual recognition of regulatory regimes, building on and going 
beyond the existing equivalence regimes’ which would be ‘embedded in a long-term, 
stable framework.’145 UK Trade Minister Garnier has called for ‘a special hybrid 
version … with a better version of equivalence or a different version of 
passporting.’146 UK Financial Conduct Authority Chief Executive Bailey has called 
in general terms for a re-thinking of international market access arrangements and 
for these arrangements to be based on an equivalence assessment which is tied to 
compliance with international standards; home country (third country) control over 
culture- and incentives-related governance requirements; and host country control 
over conduct regulation.147 An extensive industry report has been prepared 
assessing how a new approach to equivalence might be approached.148  
The EU’s preferences in relation to UK market access/equivalence are not yet 
clear. The EU is likely to be sensitive to the damage which an abrupt rupture from 
the UK capital market could wreak on the EU capital market and to the weaknesses 
in the current third country regime.149 But it can be expected to make a distinction 
between access to and membership of the single market to protect the integrity of 
the single market. It will likely protect, accordingly, the distinct and hard-fought 
regulatory and institutional governance arrangements which support the single 
market in financial services and passporting and the related equivalence/third 
country arrangements. The Commission’s delicately timed February 2017 
Equivalence Report is not directed to the UK. But it has a chilly tone, emphasising 
that equivalence is not concerned with trade liberalization but with ensuring 
prudential stability, underlining the discretionary nature of Commission decision-
making, and noting that equivalence decisions primarily benefit EU market 
participants, in particular in relation to the export rules.150  The mood music from 
the ECB is similar. One member of the ECB executive board has acknowledged 
that the position of the City of London will require consideration but has also 
                                                      
145 N 6. 
146 Quoted by Bloomberg, 16 October 2016. 
147 N 5. 
148 N 7. 
149 A leaked European Parliament ECON committee report signals the European Parliament’s concern to 
avoid a ‘badly designed’ deal which excludes the main European financial centre from the single market: D 
Boffey, ‘EU will Lose Out from Bad Brexit Deal on City, says Leaked Report,’ The Guardian, 1 February 
2017.  
150 2017 Commission Equivalence Report, n 9. 
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underlined the euro area’s concerns relating to financial stability, investor 
protection, and a level playing field for financial actors.151 But the Commission and 
the ECB will not determine the Brexit negotiations on capital market access. A 
multitude of national and supranational interests which are political, economic, and 
market-facing in orientation will influence the EU’s negotiating position. These 
interests will diverge and coalesce across shifting national, single market, and euro 
area coalitions and will be shaped by multiple factors, including competing 
perceptions of how financial markets in the EU should be organized. These interests 
and preferences are familiar from the development of the EU capital market and its 
governance arrangements. But they will be interacting in a unique context which 
makes their nature and interaction very difficult to predict. At the risk of 
reductionism, the essential question on which these interests and preferences will 
operate can be outlined in these terms: will an EU concern to ensure that capital 
markets are not disrupted and to adopt a posture signalling openness to the global 
economy after Brexit weigh more heavily than a concern to preserve the integrity of 
current governance arrangements, notably the dependence of passporting-like 
arrangements on single market membership and/or to seek competitive advantage 
over the UK? It is already clear that the structure of local financial markets, and their 
relative degree of exposure to financial stability risks, shapes how Member States 
approach market access issues generally.152 Multiple related questions arise, 
including whether the EU is prepared to offer a bespoke model to the UK, prepared 
to cede Court of Justice oversight over any related decision-making procedures for 
equivalence determinations, or prepared to adopt a minimalist approach to 
equivalence -  tied, perhaps, to a UK commitment to comply with an identified set 
of international standards. 
There is some clarity, however. The evidence suggests that the EU will rethink 
- at least to some extent - its approach to equivalence more generally. The 
Commission is reported to be in the process of reviewing the equivalence regime153 
and has recently set out its stall on equivalence in its 2017 Equivalence Report which 
suggests, as discussed in section 5.3, some appetite for a recasting of the regime.  
The review initiative predates Brexit, reflecting a wider pre-Brexit political focus on 
the third country regime. Earlier in 2015 the ECOFIN Council had, in the context 
of CMU, called on the Commission to assess the impact of third-country regimes, 
including equivalence arrangements, on the structure of European capital markets 
and on financial sector competitiveness.154 At the administrative ESA level, ESMA, 
which has built significant technocratic capacity and credibility in advising the 
                                                      
151 M Khan, ‘ECB’s Coeuré Raises Concerns over City’s EU Access after Brexit’, Financial Times, 22 January 
2017. 
152 Quaglia, n 50. 
153 A Barber and J Brunsden, ‘EU Review Casts Doubt on City’s Hopes for ‘Equivalence’ as Brexit Last 
Resort’ Financial Times, 7 November 2016, and C Grant, Brussels Prepared for a Hard Brexit, Centre for 
European Reform, 21 November 2016. 
154 Ecofin Council Conclusions on Commission Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union (Council 
Document 13922/15), 10 November 2015.  
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Commission on equivalence assessments, has called for refinements to the 
equivalence regime and for a strengthening of its role.155 There are certainly grounds 
for suggesting that a new equivalence regime will appear in the short to medium 
term, although whether this takes the form of a bespoke EU/UK model which 
forms part of a Free Trade Agreement, or a new, horizontal third country regime 
set out in EU legislation and applying erga omnes, is not clear. 
 
5.2 A BESPOKE EU/UK ARRANGEMENT 
 
The current third country/equivalence arrangements were not designed to manage 
the EU’s relationship with the UK capital market or to moderate the risks arising 
from a blockage in the UK financial services pipeline - which carries some 35% of 
EU wholesale financial services. A bespoke arrangement, proposed in the Article 50 
letter, is not accordingly to be lightly dismissed. Speculating on the shape of any 
bespoke equivalence arrangement to be contained in a EU/UK Free Trade 
Agreement is nonetheless a fraught exercise.  
In principle, such an agreement should be achievable. Verdier has suggested 
that successful forms of mutual recognition/equivalence are usually associated with 
strong home (third country) and host institutions which support the rules applied 
in each jurisdiction; cultural, legal, and market development similarities; strong 
private demand for such arrangements; similar regulatory incentives for home and 
host states to cooperate and support market access; the creation through the 
equivalence process of incentives to comply; and bespoke cooperation 
arrangements.156 All of these conditions are either (more or less) in place or can be 
constructed with goodwill and some imaginative design – but goodwill and an 
appetite for imaginative design cannot be assumed. Another study has suggested 
that equivalence can be achieved where there is parity in public policy objectives; 
shared regulatory principles; a shared regulatory ethos; and shared intended 
outcomes.157  All four of these elements should also characterize EU/UK 
negotiations.  
But there are two significant difficulties. First, there is an asymmetry to the 
different incentives of the EU and the UK, not least among them that the EU may 
subordinate its economic interests in the EU capital market to its wider interest in 
protecting the integrity of the single market and its need to signal accordingly that 
third country rights must be inferior to EU membership rights. Second, the related 
institutional issues and preferences, particularly in relation to potential supervisory 
solutions, are complex. EU financial governance in relation to supervision has 
                                                      
155 ESMA has, eg, called for the EMIR equivalence process to be expedited: ESMA/2015/1254.  More 
recently and more generally ESMA Chairman Maijoor has called on the EU to consider redesigning its 
approach to equivalence, in particular to address supervisory risks: Keynote Speech, Prime Finance 
Conference, 23 January 2017. 
156 Verdier, n 102. 
157 2017 FSNF/Norton Rose Report, n 7. 
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national and supranational elements which interact within the European System of 
Financial Supervision. Supervision is an essentially national function in the capital 
markets sphere - national supervisors and ESMA cooperate in relation to 
supervisory coordination but ESMA has only very limited direct supervisory 
powers. Allocating the supervision of third country actors and the related fiscal risks 
is not therefore a straightforward task, as the AIFMD negotiations made clear. 
Overall, and as the often-torturous negotiations on the EU’s current third country 
rules suggest, negotiations are unlikely to be easy.  
For example, there is some support in the UK for a light-touch equivalence 
arrangement based on an EU/UK commitment to compliance with (identified) 
international standards.158 While such an economical approach has the attraction of 
side-stepping the complexities and vagaries of a full equivalence assessment and of 
managing the regulatory divergence difficulty noted in the Article 50 letter, it is not 
a straightforward proposition. There is little experience with such an approach. 
International standards have hitherto been used to set a base line for the support of 
financial stability and other regulatory objectives internationally; they have not been 
designed for market access and to facilitate deference by host regulators. While 
international standards do form part of equivalence assessments internationally, 
compliance does not replace the assessment. Questions also arise as to which 
standards would ground any equivalence agreement – there are now a great number 
in the capital markets sphere, deriving from IOSCO’s work in particular. Difficult 
issues also arise relating to the treatment of standards where the EU has previously 
‘carved out’ from the standard. The EU has not followed the Basel III agreement 
in several respects, for example, and might be expected to resist an equivalence 
arrangement which allowed the UK to follow a different set of Basel rules to its 
competitive advantage. International financial governance already provides a 
cautionary tale. The US SEC’s agreement to allow international/third country 
issuers in the US to use International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) rather 
than US GAAP for regulatory purposes in the US was dependent on compliance 
with IFRS as adopted by the IASB (the relevant ISSB) – not compliance with ‘IFRS 
with carve-outs’.159  
Supervision poses a distinct challenge. There is already some concern that the 
equivalence arrangement which governs third country CCP access to the EU 
market, and which is based on ESMA registration and third country supervision, is 
not sufficiently robust. ESMA has raised concerns as to the EU’s ‘open’ approach 
to CCP equivalence under EMIR which relies heavily on the third country as the 
CCP supervisor.160 More generally, there is some concern in the European 
                                                      
158 Ibid. 
159 SEC Press Release 2007–235, SEC Takes Action to Improve the Consistency of Disclosure to US 
Investors in Foreign Companies, 15 November 2007, and SEC Release Nos 33-8879 and 34-57026. 
160 ESMA Report on EMIR (ESMA/2015/1254). ESMA has warned that it has very few powers to 
intervene in an emergency and that the EU market may be at risk. Recently, ESMA Chairman Maijoor has 
warned that the EU ‘is an island of equivalence and third country reliance in a world that has mostly opted 
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Parliament as to how the post-Brexit cross-border supply of financial services from 
the UK would be supervised,161 while the Commission in its 2017 Equivalence 
Report has identified supervision as an area needing more attention.162 Would or 
should the EU require that all UK financial actors seeking EU market access under 
a new equivalence regime register with ESMA, and what degree of supervisory 
oversight would the EU require to protect the financial stability of the EU financial 
system? The complexities then start to mount. Under current constitutional 
arrangements, could ESMA be appropriately empowered to register and have (some 
degree of) supervisory oversight over a potentially wide range of UK financial 
actors, bearing in the mind the over 5,000 UK passports currently in use? Aside 
altogether from the fiscal risk allocation problem, the Meroni restriction on the 
exercise of discretionary power by EU agencies may prove troublesome; ESMA’s 
supervisory powers are circumscribed and limited to ensure compliance with 
Meroni.163 If not ESMA, then which Member State would act as the EU supervisory 
anchor for cross-border activity from the UK? There are examples from the 
Prospectus Directive and the AIFMD but they are sector specific. Alternatively, 
would UK-based home/third country supervision, supported by supervisory 
cooperation arrangements managed through ESMA and built on the coordination 
arrangements in which the UK currently participates, suffice – functionally and 
politically? It is also difficult to envisage an equivalence arrangement without some 
form of monitoring and dispute resolution authority to avoid defection problems. 
But the EU is unlikely to cede oversight by the Court of Justice of the EU. It is also 
unlikely to cede Commission monitoring and decision-making, given the 
Commission’s long experience in this area. The European Parliament is increasingly 
active in international financial governance and may also seek an oversight role.164 
GATS considerations also arise. A bespoke model may breach the GATS ‘most 
favoured nation’ (MFN) clause. Exceptions to the MFN obligation are, however, 
available for ‘economic integration arrangements’ which can include mutual 
recognition/equivalence agreements.165 
 
                                                      
for registering individually those infrastructures and market participants which want to do cross-border 
business’ and raised concerns as to whether ‘sufficient assurance’ is available that the risks of third country 
infrastructures in the EU are adequately assessed and addressed by the third country regulator: Keynote 
Speech, Prime Finance Conference, 23 January 2017.  
161 J Brunsden, ‘MEPs Urge Closer Oversight of City of London after Brexit,’ Financial Times, 10 March 
2017. 
162 N 9, 12. 
163 Case 9/56 Meroni v. High Authority [1957-1958] ECR 133. The Court of Justice of the EU has ruled in 
the Short Selling case that ESMA can exercise direct supervisory/intervention powers but its discretion must 
be controlled through conditions set at the legislative level: Case C-270/12 UK v Council and Parliament, 22 
January 2014. 
164 European Parliament, ECON Committee, Report on the EU Role in the Framework of International 
Financial, Monetary and Regulatory Institutions and Bodies (A8-0027/2016) (March 2016).  
165 The Financial Service Annex to the GATS covers mutual recognition arrangements and provides for an 
exception generally to the MFN principle, whether in the context of an FTA or otherwise. 
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5.3 A NEW HORIZONTAL EU EQUIVALENCE REGIME 
 
Given the many uncertainties, this analysis focuses on how the Commission might 
design a new, EU equivalence regime for its post Brexit interaction with third 
countries. Leaving to one side the different EU interests and preferences which may 
shape a new third country/equivalence arrangement (which are considered at the 
end of this section), how, from an EU perspective, might a new arrangement be 
designed?  
It is not surprising that equivalence is now on the Commission’s agenda, even 
allowing for the Brexit incentives for placing it there. EU policy discourse on 
financial governance is currently framed in terms of the single rulebook and more, 
rather than less, harmonization. This is particularly apparent in the wide-ranging 
November 2016 reform agenda which the Commission has recently adopted and 
which seeks to respond to stakeholder concerns on the crisis era reforms.166 A 
driving concern of these reforms is to remove incoherence and inconsistencies 
across the single rulebook. The Commission has, at the same time, signalled the 
importance of proportionality in the application of EU rules, but the direction of 
travel is clear. The equivalence regime is ripe for reform, being piece-meal, 
inconsistent, and subject to a range of different procedures and conditions 
depending on the measure in question. There is therefore a logic to constructing a 
single, harmonized equivalence regime in place of the current complex patchwork 
of rules. The logic is all the greater given the potential risk to the EU from a 
disruption to the EU capital market arising from defects in how the current third 
country rules apply. A more consistent and stable equivalence process would put 
third country access to the EU capital market on a more secure footing, with 
positive spill-over effects for market stability and efficiency.  
Given the Commission’s current direction of travel, it is reasonable to start by 
proposing that any new regime be located in a horizontal single market measure 
(likely a Regulation) with a procedural orientation which would address how 
equivalence is assessed, whether for market access or rule export.167 It is unlikely 
that any such measure would significantly expand the current access arrangements 
or restrict the current exporting arrangements, even allowing for the potential capital 
market benefits, given the distinct political and institutional interests, which are 
often sector-specific,168 which have shaped these arrangements.169 It is also unlikely 
that decision-making would depart from its current supranational orientation and 
                                                      
166 Commission, Communication, Call for Evidence – EU Regulatory Framework for Financial Services 
(COM (2016) 855) (2016), and Commission, Staff Working Document on the Call for Evidence (SWD 
(2016) 359) (2016).  
167 This discussion assumes a capital market scope, but a regime with a wider financial services reach could 
also be designed. 
168 The access rules for asset managers under the AIFMD being a case in point, given the distinct French 
interests engaged. See Moloney, n 50, 307-308, and Ferran, n 50. 
169 The Commission’s 2017 Equivalence Report underlines that the different equivalence provisions are 
tailored to the specific needs of the measure in question: n 9, 7. 
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location within the single market method. While new models based on various 
forms of oversight and decision-making by bespoke EU/third country tribunals or 
committees (on the lines of the committees which oversee Free Trade Agreements, 
for example170) could be envisaged, there is little ground on which to speculate that 
the EU would concede the removal of the Commission as decision-maker or the 
Court of Justice as arbiter. The attachment to supranationalism and to EU 
governance methods for EU capital market governance is clear from the fierce 
opposition of the European Parliament to the Single Resolution Fund element of 
the Single Resolution Mechanism (which forms a pillar of Banking Union) being 
governed in part by an intergovernmental agreement.171 Given the Parliament’s 
close focus at present on international financial governance (noted below) it can be 
expected to provide stiff resistance to any such proposal – and the Commission has 
no incentives to propose such a model. Some institutional enhancements should, 
however, be adopted. 
The role of ESMA should be formalised, reflecting the dominance of 
technocratic regulators in mutual recognition/equivalence regimes internationally.   
Decision-making should move closer to ESMA with the equivalence decision taking 
the form of a ‘binding technical standard’ (BTS) rather than, as at present, an 
‘implementing act’ on which ESMA advises the Commission.172 Where 
administrative rules take the form of BTSs, distinct procedural arrangements apply 
to rule-making. The ESAs propose the measure in question and while the 
Commission may ultimately veto or amend the measure, procedural constraints 
apply to the Commission and transparency requirements are imposed. A number of 
benefits would follow. ESMA now has significant experience in managing the 
technical and diplomatic challenges raised by equivalence determinations. Its first 
set of technical advice on the credit rating agency equivalence regime, for example, 
adopted an ‘objective-based’ and ‘holistic’ perspective, identified and assessed 
equivalence against seven core areas, and led to a positive Commission decision 
within months.173 Its approach to the US credit rating agency regulation assessment 
suggests a pragmatic, outcomes-focused, and politically adept approach. ESMA 
reported that equivalence involved examining the ‘combined effect of provisions’ 
as well as the scope and extent of supervisory powers; that the ‘few remaining 
uncertainties’ were not material; and that it took comfort from its discussions with 
the SEC.174 Likewise, in its approach to CCP regulation equivalence ESMA was 
concerned to avoid a ‘zero sum’ approach,175 and advised that a conditional 
                                                      
170 On these committees see Lang and Conyers, n 38. There is little empirical evidence from the operation 
of these committees which are relatively recent in origin. 
171 See, eg, N Moloney, ‘European Banking Union: Assessing its Risks and Resilience’ 51 Common Market 
Law Review (2014) 1609. 
172 ESMA has called for this reform in relation to the EMIR equivalence regime: ESMA/2015/1524. 
173 ESMA/2012/259. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Speech by ESMA Chairman Maijoor on ‘International Co-ordination of the Regulation and Supervision 
of OTC Derivatives Markets’, 17 October 2013.    
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equivalence approach be used in some cases (in that where formal regulatory 
equivalence was not achieved, it could be met by means of internal CCP policies 
and procedures). Similarly, following the delayed Commission/US CFTC CCP 
equivalence decision, ESMA declared it would ‘do everything within its powers’ to 
deal with the outstanding procedures for US CCP recognition in the EU.176  A more 
secure embedding of ESMA in the equivalence process, and a shift to decision-
making through BTSs, would also increase the transparency of the process and the 
opportunities for regulatory learning internationally. The equivalence process would 
also benefit functionally from the close links ESMA has formed with its regulatory 
counterparts internationally and the related soft power which follows.177 ESMA has, 
for example, committed to monitoring US equivalence on rating agency regulation 
through cooperation arrangements between it and the US SEC.178 Greater ESMA 
involvement should also reduce, at least, the potential for politicization  
Substantively, and in relation to the equivalence assessment, an outcomes- or 
substitute-compliance-based approach, embedded in EU legislation (current 
references to an outcomes-based approach are in the recitals to the relevant EU 
measures), would give the process flexibility and respond to the reality that systems 
of regulation are dynamic and diverge. The related assessment could also reflect the 
significantly greater granularity in, and institutional support for, international 
financial governance since the financial crisis;179 compliance with specified 
international standards could accordingly form part of the assessment process. The 
assessment should be primarily directed, however, to third country compliance with 
specific sets of principles adopted for each capital market measure which currently 
deploys equivalence. These principles could be developed by ESMA based on a 
delegation from the co-legislators in the relevant legislation. Lessons could be drawn 
from, for example, the Australian/ASIC model which contains an extensive set of 
principles governing third country access. The new model should also 
institutionalize the proportionality principle, which has recently become a priority 
concern of EU capital market governance.180 A proportionality analysis would allow 
ESMA to tailor the nature of the equivalence assessment to the risks which the 
jurisdiction posed to the EU market, whether in terms of financial stability or market 
efficiency. The new model could also usefully institutionalize the subsidiarity 
principle which is meant to act as a guiding principle for EU capital market 
                                                      
176 ESMA Press Release, 1 February 2016. 
177 See S Lavenex, ‘The External Face of Differentiated Integration: third country participation in EU 
sectoral bodies’ 22 Journal of European Public Policy (2015) 838 (examining the distinct functionalist dynamics 
and networks which such agencies can generate). The importance of such soft power to the development 
of international regulatory networks has been extensively documented, following Slaughter’s pioneering 
analysis: A-M Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University Press, 2004). 
178 ESMA/2012/259. 
179 ESMA already refers to international standards in assessing equivalence, as was the case with its 
examination of the Australian regime governing CCPs, eg (ESMA/2013/1159). 
180 See N Moloney, ‘EU Financial Governance and Brexit: Institutional Change or Business as Usual?’ 42(1) 
European Law Review (2017) 112. 
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governance; in this context, it could signal the EU’s willingness to ‘defer to 
difference.’ 
More radically, the current openness of the EU’s equivalence arrangements in 
relation to market access needs to be reconsidered. Many of the international 
examples considered in section four are based on a host country registration and 
exemption model, not on blanket market access, and allow the host regime some 
supervisory control over third country actors. At present, EU market-access-related 
equivalence determinations are not based on the ‘registration and exemption’ 
approach typically followed internationally. While ESMA registration or recognition 
is usually required, the registration process is typically not as detailed as a traditional 
authorization process would be, and does not take the form of a ‘gatekeeping’ 
exercise. Third country CCP recognition under EMIR (Article 25), for example, is 
procedural and not substantive in orientation, being directed in the main to the 
provision of information to ESMA. Similarly, third country investment firm 
registration by ESMA under MiFIR does not involve a substantive assessment of 
the risks a firm may pose to the EU, although ESMA may withdraw registration 
where there is documented evidence that the firm is acting in a manner clearly 
prejudicial to investors or the orderly functioning of markets, or is in breach of its 
regulatory obligations in its home country. In addition, ESMA has very limited 
ongoing oversight powers over third country actors. One solution to this difficulty 
is to require third country actors currently subject to ESMA registration to agree to 
more extensive ESMA registration and supervisory oversight authority.181 But this 
is not a straightforward proposition, even in relation to the relatively small 
population of actors covered by the current ESMA registration regime. First, the 
Meroni constraint arises. While the 2014 Short Selling ruling suggests that as long as 
any new registration/supervisory powers are appropriately detailed and confined, 
Meroni would not be breached,182 the granular requirements of ongoing supervision 
could place significant pressure on Meroni. A second and greater challenge is raised 
by the appropriate allocation of the fiscal risks of supervision. The immense political 
and institutional difficulties engaged by risk allocation and risk sharing, recently 
exposed by Banking Union, suggest that significant change to ESMA’s supervisory 
role is unlikely. While ESMA currently supervises credit rating agencies and trade 
repositories, these actors do not pose significant fiscal risk. The potential fiscal risks 
posed by CCPs are of an entirely different magnitude and would require distinct risk 
allocation/sharing mechanisms on the lines of the Banking Union arrangements, 
which could rapidly become very complex in a cross-jurisdictional context. 
Investment firm fiscal risk, while not of the same order as CCP fiscal risk, would 
also require risk allocation and sharing arrangements. The easier solution may be to 
enhance existing ESMA-based coordination arrangements, notably colleges of 
                                                      
181 A private contracting option has been suggested by one analysis which would see UK CCPs voluntarily 
contract to be subject to ECB supervision: FSNF/Norton Rose Report 2017, n 7. 
182 N 163. 
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supervisors, and incorporate third country supervisors; and to confer on ESMA a 
suite of new, targeted powers – these would assume third country supervision but 
would strengthen ESMA’s oversight powers (including powers to inspect third 
country actors) and allow for some emergency or precautionary action (such as the 
suspension of activities). The new colleges could operate under EU procedural 
requirements, include ESMA as the EU-based ‘supervisor’ with certain enumerated 
powers, and deliver closer cooperation and coordination than the current third 
country regime. While EU colleges of supervisors are typically associated with the 
banking markets, EU oversight through ESMA of capital market colleges of 
supervisors is becoming more sophisticated and templates are becoming available, 
notably in relation to CCPs.183 Alternatively, a third country supervisor could be 
required, by means of an ESMA MoU, to incorporate the risks to the EU market in 
its home supervision of the actor in question – but such an approach could be 
challenging to negotiate and to police.    
The risks of third country defection and of third country regulatory dynamism, 
and the related dangers of abrupt withdrawals of equivalence, also need 
consideration. At present the equivalence regime is peppered with warning of 
ongoing Commission review184 and the Commission’s 2017 Equivalence Report 
underlines the importance of review and the possibility of decisions being 
withdrawn. But the current equivalence regime does not include clear procedural 
means for identifying risks to the EU from third country regulatory dynamism 
and/or defection. Drawing on the monitoring and review functions which are a 
feature of some regimes internationally (including the Australian and US models), 
formal notification of ‘material’ regulatory change could be required and principles 
governing the nature of ‘materiality’ established. Peer review could also be 
incorporated. Peer review is increasingly being used as a tool to strengthen 
cooperation and convergence between regulators internationally and to limit 
defections from international standards. It is, for example, deployed by the FSB in 
relation to international standards.185 An equivalence decision could be made 
conditional on a positive outcome from an FSB ‘country review’186 or from the 
regular IMF ‘Financial Sector Assessment Programs’ (FSAP) reviews, and on such 
an outcome being sustained. IMF FSAP assessments are required every five years 
for those jurisdictions whose financial sectors have the greatest impact on financial 
stability. The related IMF Integrated Surveillance Decision considers the risks to 
                                                      
183 ESMA already sits on CCP colleges of supervisors, reviews the activities of colleges, stress tests CCPs, 
and engages in peer review of CCP supervision. See, eg, ESMA, Peer Review under EMIR, Art 21 
(ESMA/2016/1683) (2016). 
184 The Commission’s Australian CCP equivalence decision, eg, warns that the Commission, informed by 
ESMA, will continue to monitor the evolution of the Australian legal and supervisory framework and the 
conditions on which the equivalence decision was taken (Commission Decision 2014/755/EU). 
185 See FSB, Handbook for FSB Peer Reviews (2015).  
186 An FSB ‘country review’ addresses the implementation and effectiveness of regulatory, supervisory, or 
other financial sector policies in achieving the desired outcomes in a specific FSB member jurisdiction: 
Handbook, n 185, 2. 
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macro financial stability and the related policy framework in the relevant 
jurisdiction, while the (optional) Report on Observance of Standards and Codes 
(ROSC) covers compliance with ISSB standards (including IOSCO’s) and leads to 
a Detailed Assessment of Outcomes. ESMA is already integrating these peer reviews 
in its equivalence assessments. In its recent quasi-equivalence review of the AIFMD, 
for example, it considered the capacity and track record of third country regulators 
in relation to supervision, including by reference to IMF FSAP findings.187 
Alternatively, ESMA’s now extensive experience in peer review of its member 
regulators might be deployed,188 particularly as ESMA’s supervisory 
convergence/coordination activities are directed to the assessment of outcomes189 
– a feature of equivalence arrangements internationally. A third country might 
therefore be asked, as part of the equivalence process, to commit to a five-yearly 
ESMA review of the relevant regulatory system. Failure or indicators of concern 
would not lead to termination, but could lead to the opening of a bilateral EU/third 
country review process. Features such as these would reduce the contingent quality 
of the current regime. 
There are, of course, difficulties with these proposals. Any consequential 
strengthening of ESMA’s institutional position as an administrative actor within EU 
financial governance may not be palatable to the Member States, the Commission, 
or Parliament. And while a strengthening of ESMA’s role would render the 
equivalence process more technocratic, it is impossible to remove political 
preferences, particularly as the Commission can veto or change any BTS on 
equivalence proposed by ESMA. But this may not be a significant limitation. Given 
the distributive effects of capital market regulation and market access decisions, and 
the complex related interactions with the EU’s geo-political relations, it is desirable 
that Commission oversight provide a means through which political interests can 
be expressed. A move to the BTS process, however, would moderate Commission 
discretion, particularly as ESMA is increasingly robust in defending its proposals for 
BTSs against Commission revisions or veto.190 
 
5.4 THE INTERESTS AT STAKE 
 
The prospects for any such new EU regime depend on the interests and preferences 
at stake.  
The Commission has already signalled its preferences for greater centralization 
of market access and of equivalence-related decisions within the Commission, 
                                                      
187 ESMA/2016/1140. 
188 ESMA’s peer reviews of its member supervisors are becoming increasingly granular and robust, 
including its peer review of best execution supervision (ESMA/2015/494) and in relation to the short 
selling regime (ESMA/2015/1791). 
189 See recently ESMA, Supervisory Convergence Work Programme (2017). 
190 See, eg, ESMA’s querying of the revisions which the Commission requested to its proposals for bond 
market transparency rules under MiFIR: Letter from ESMA to the Commission, 2 May 2016 
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including through its original proposals for centralization of market access decisions 
under MiFID II and MiFIR which were watered down during the European 
Parliament and Council negotiations.191 It has also signalled its preference for a more 
transparent and politically accountable comitology process. In February 2017, it 
proposed a series of reforms to amend the Comitology Regulation 182/2011 which 
currently governs the equivalence process.192 The reforms are designed to reduce 
the number of abstentions on comitology-based decisions and to ensure the 
Commission receives stronger political guidance. It is hard to avoid the implication 
that this essentially ‘housekeeping’ reform could usefully provide the Commission 
with political cover if equivalence decisions become contested. The Commission’s 
2017 Equivalence Report is more revealing. The Report concludes that the 
equivalence regime is ‘broadly satisfactory’ but outlines four areas which may require 
‘increased attention.’193 In a finding which does not augur well for the UK, the 
Commission has suggested that its risk-based, proportionate approach to 
equivalence may need further examination, particularly given the need to ensure 
proportionate treatment for ‘high impact’ and ‘low impact’ markets. It has also 
suggested that greater coherence be brought to the regime, particularly in terms of 
the equivalence assessment covering both regulatory and supervisory frameworks 
and in relation to the roles played by the ESAs.  The final two areas for attention 
cover how ongoing monitoring of equivalence decisions can best be achieved, 
including in relation to the ESAs’ role, and how the nature of the equivalence 
assessment can be communicated to third countries. These areas ‘for increased 
attention’ do not suggest a Commission appetite for major reform or for a 
noticeably more liberal approach. More revealingly, the tone of the Commission’s 
report indicates a determination to continue to control the equivalence process and 
to protect the discretion currently granted to the Commission.  
 It can be predicted reasonably safely accordingly that the Commission is likely 
to support reforms which further the coherence of the equivalence regime, which 
extend Commission power in international financial governance, and which engage 
the Member States more fully, providing political cover. The Commission is unlikely 
to support a significant empowering of ESMA given the autonomy and discretion 
the Commission has long enjoyed in this area and the EU’s growing capacity as an 
actor (often through the Commission) in international financial diplomacy.194 The 
2017 Equivalence Report acknowledges that the ESAs’ role in equivalence 
determinations can be finessed, but its concern is primarily with the ESAs as 
information conduits.195 On the other hand, the Report reveals a Commission 
concern for the effectiveness of third country supervisory arrangements and for 
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enhanced supervisory cooperation between third country and EU supervisors, 
including in relation to onsite inspections and data exchange, suggesting that an 
enhancement of ESMA’s coordination powers, if not direct oversight powers, may 
follow.    
The European Parliament, by contrast, appears increasingly suspicious of the 
Commission’s power in international financial governance196 and so may welcome 
any reforms, including the empowerment of ESMA, which dilute that power – 
although it has recently adopted a more sceptical posture to the ESAs, albeit 
primarily in relation to their regulatory governance functions (where the 
Parliament’s prerogatives are most at stake) and less so in relation to the ESAs’ role 
in supervisory governance.197 The ECB may have similar preferences. Based on 
current evidence, it can be expected to support greater standardization and to call 
for reforms which enhance the EU’s ability to secure financial stability – although 
it may have conflicted preferences in relation to any empowerment of ESMA, 
particularly in relation to supervisory coordination, given its dominance as Banking 
Union’s bank supervisor. 
As noted in section three, Member States’ preferences on market access and 
rule export have historically varied depending on the market segment in question, 
but clashes tend to arise between those open to liberalization and those concerned 
to limit market access, whether for competitive reasons or because of concerns 
relating to financial stability.198 Post Brexit, however, Member State preferences may 
change and there may be a concern to signal openness and the attractiveness of the 
EU market – particularly if the liquidity, stability, or efficiency of the EU capital 
market is compromised post Brexit. The absence of the UK may also lead to easier 
negotiations. While Member States are unlikely to adopt an overtly protectionist 
posture given the risks to EU growth, the UK can be expected to have been at the 
far end of the spectrum in terms of tolerance for liberalization - its absence may 
ease the negotiation process.199 Some signs do not augur well, however. The highly 
technical Commission proposal to reform EU securitization rules, a flagship 
element of the CMU agenda and which was proceeding relatively speedily through 
the legislative process prior to Brexit, has recently hit an obstruction in the form of 
a post-Brexit decision wariness in some Member States, notably France and 
                                                      
196 European Parliament, ECON Committee, Report on the EU Role in the Framework of International 
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Germany, to include facilitative third country access rules based on equivalence lest 
they set a precedent for the UK.200  
Nonetheless, there may be considerable institutional and political support for 
reform, particularly if the reform would represent a ‘quick win’ for a post Brexit EU 
and signal its openness to the international market. But it is unlikely that any new 
regime would be in place at the point at which the UK leaves the EU. The ability of 
the market to move operations to the EU 27, and the significant ingenuity with 
which UK firms can be expected to approach EU access, will reduce the level of 
disruption, but it will not remove the risk of significant market dislocation. In the 
short term, therefore, much will depend on the political environment in which a 
transitional arrangement is negotiated. 
 
 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
 
When the UK leaves the EU the EU’s ‘investment banker’ will become a ‘third 
country.’ This re-characterization of the UK has legal consequences which have 
significant implications for the stability, liquidity, and efficiency of the EU capital 
market. The determinants of capital market growth and stability in the EU are many 
and various and the extent to which EU regulation is transformative of capital 
market evolution is contested. But the success of the CMU reform agenda, and the 
extent to which the EU capital market will safely absorb the loss of the UK from 
the single market, are likely to depend, to a significant degree, on the EU’s rules 
governing how third countries interact with EU financial governance and how those 
rules evolve, whether in an EU/UK Free Trade Agreement or otherwise. 
This discussion uses a legal-institutionalist analysis to examine the current suite 
of third country rules, their potential ramifications for the post-Brexit EU capital 
market and for the CMU agenda, and the institutional and other preferences which 
shape these rules and how they apply. The third country rules apply across two 
vectors: they govern access to the EU (access); and they also govern how EU 
financial actors engage with third country actors (export). In each case, the notion 
of ‘equivalence’ is used to permit access with a degree of deference to home/third 
country rules (access) or to moderate how EU regulation applies to engagement 
with third country actors (export). But equivalence is an elusive concept and the 
procedural framework within which it operates is unstable. Brexit will place further 
and likely intense pressure on the inherent instability in the equivalence method as 
it is currently constructed. Risks to the stability, liquidity, efficiency of the EU capital 
market and to the achievement of the CMU agenda may follow. 
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International financial governance has hitherto been largely concerned with 
standard-setting; there are few examples on which a new equivalence arrangement 
could be based. But there are some lessons from the international examples 
canvassed in this discussion, although they must be interpreted with caution given 
the extent to which equivalence regimes internationally reflect the distinct 
preferences and regulatory capacities of the states involved. These lessons are 
incorporated into a proposal for how a new equivalence regime which would limit 
the risks to the EU capital market could be constructed. The third country rules are, 
however, likely to be a location of contestation given the distinct preferences and 
interests which the confluence of Brexit and the CMU agenda is likely to generate. 
Indeed, the fate of the third country regime, and its application to UK/EU relations, 
will likely be a bellwether for the fate of the Brexit negotiations more generally.    
  
 
